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Abstract
The prevailing assumption among Western governments is that a free and 
independent news media is a key to political transition in the developing world. 
Consequently, media assistance interventions are components of all Western states' 
democratization, good governance and civil society promotion strategies. It is not 
clear, however, that Western support for the news media has a lasting effect on the 
political transition of the developing world. There are strong militating factors that 
hinder the establishment of a free and independent media sector in most developing 
states. This study examines specific aspects of Canada's media assistance strategy 
and engages in a comparative analysis o f developing world states receiving Canadian 
media aid. Findings yield recommendations for improved effectiveness of 
interventions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Introduction
Canada and other Western governments have long advocated media assistance 
interventions as a key component of democratization, good governance and civil so­
ciety promotion strategies. The end of the Cold War presented a renewed opportu­
nity to re-structure the news media in states that had been denied the rights of free 
expression and access to information previously.1 Western governments conse­
quently re-emphasized media assistance strategies as a component o f political devel­
opment after 1989. There are two overarching justifications for this strategy. First, 
Western governments contend that free, plural, independent media are a cornerstone 
of political development. Second, access to independent news media is a human 
right. More specifically, in states undergoing political transition from an authoritar­
ian or totalitarian regime, the rationale for promoting free and independent media is 
practical: free expression allows individuals to develop their intellectual and spiritual 
capacities, and free expression can promote the search for civic truths which, in the­
ory, may lead to reconciliation and peaceful cooperation among citizens of a state 
and consequently to economic development.2 But despite the apparent universality 
of these justifications, the progress o f media rights has been erratic as new democ­
ratic states emerged after the Cold War. Large sums have been spent on media de­
velopment without much thought as to what form either journalism or democracy
1 Aspen Institute, journalism and Emerging Democracies: Lessons from Societies in Transition (Washington, D.C.:
The Aspen Institute, 2001), 1.
2 Aspen, 5
1
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should take.3 Nonetheless, Western governments continue to promote media assis­
tance as a component of Official Development Assistance (ODA)4.
Recently, however, the media, as an aspect of promotion strategies, have begun to 
face renewed scrutiny because it is apparent that a mechanical view of the role and 
function of the news media is challenged by the unique characteristics o f developing 
world states. In the specific case o f Canada's media assistance interventions, this pa­
per argues that Canada's ODA for the media is poorly-focused, the rationale is gen­
eral, expectations are uncertain and outcomes are inconsistent. In this way, media 
assistance interventions may reflect in microcosm one of the underlying criticisms of 
Canada's overall ODA strategy: Canada's ODA budget is too small and too widely 
scattered to effect change and positive, enduring outcomes. More than that, the the­
ory behind all Western media assistance interventions may be inherently flawed.
Free media may be attainable but unsustainable. Independent media may be both 
difficult to attain and even harder to sustain given particular political and economic 
conditions in many developing world states. And developing plural media may sim­
ply be impossible in states riven by sectarian and ethic divides. In the worst case, 
unrestrained free expression may even lead to the failure of a state or in the worse 
case incite genocide. The example of the media in Western political development, 
although an attractive and understandable model, may be too simple a paradigm for 
the complexities of the developing world.
3 Aspen, 13
4 ODA is defined by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as funding flowing
from official agencies that have as their main objective the promotion of economic development and welfare and 
are concessional -- they are loaned on soft terms and have a grant component of at least 25 percent. Source: The 
Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; avail­
able from www.oecd.org/dac.
2
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This study has two purposes. The primary purpose is to examine Canadian media 
ODA. Secondarily, this paper is an investigation of the extent to which Western me­
dia principles, techniques, standards and ethics are applicable in the developing 
world. This study examines these issues as follows: first, the problem and the pur­
pose of the study are established. Then, the history of the theory behind both politi­
cal development and media assistance is reviewed. Next, Canada's news media as­
sistance strategies, past and present, are examined in light of Canadian foreign aid 
objectives. This includes analysis of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
that receive Canadian media assistance. Examples of Canada’s media assistance in­
terventions, economic, political and social conditions of these recipient states, NGOs 
involved in the intervention, and outcomes of select media assistance interventions 
provide the data from which findings and discussion are generated. Specialists and 
experts in the area of media assistance are used to verify findings. Lastly, and in 
summation, recommendations for future Canadian media assistance interventions are 
proposed.
This research is timely since the Canadian government is currently engaged in a 
review of its foreign aid objectives. Additionally, since research into Western gov­
ernments' media assistance in the developing world is still in its infancy5 and the 
body of literature on the intent, application and effectiveness of media assistance in­
terventions, while growing, remains small, this paper will also add to the literature 
on promotion strategies by examining a single facet of ODA, but a facet upon which 
great expectations of political development are founded.
5 Ross Howard, Working Paper 19: International Media Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons
Learned. (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'CHngendael', 2003), 7.
3
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1.1 The Problem/Purpose of Study
The problem researched in this study is best framed as a question: Is media assis­
tance an effective way to spend Canada's ODA? In order to know this we must de­
termine if media assistance interventions work. In seeking an answer to this question 
we must ask supplementary questions: What is media assistance? What does the Ca­
nadian International Development Agency (CIDA) expect media assistance to ac­
complish? Is the relationship between the media and political development norma­
tive, or is a political transition far too complex a process for a cause-and-effect rela­
tionship between a media assistance intervention and an outcome to be clearly seen? 
Is it even worthwhile to look for a normative relationship such as this?
Assuming at the outset that the process of political development is rarely linear, a 
simplistic normative relationship between media assistance and political develop­
ment is unlikely to exist. However, this does not infer that a relationship of some 
form does not exist. There are, this paper suggests, key mitigating factors affecting 
both the success and the failure o f a media assistance intervention. Also, larger po­
litical events may overwhelm others factors and players in a political transition. In­
deed, in the fluidity of political transition the media's role may be over estimated.
On the contrary, we may not even be aware of the extent of the media's participation 
in a successful transition or, for that matter, the media's failure to perform its func­
tion in a transition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Media Assistance: The transfer of a Western political development
The modem term "media assistance" applies to the subset of democratization, 
good governance, civil society and related promotion strategies that have a media 
component. It is a broad subset containing several variations. In its most identifi­
able form media assistance is the promotion of news media and the profession of 
journalism in a developing state. Donor states transfer technology such as printing 
presses, radio and television transmitters, and provide funding for direct training of 
and support for developing world journalists.6 Canadian NGOs such as Canadian 
Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) and the Institute for Media, Politics and Civil 
Society (IMPACS), as well as universities and other organizations, perform such 
functions. From there, media assistance spreads into a wider web of interventions. 
One also finds media assistance interventions that are designed to support the work 
of journalists, including the training o f management personnel, market analysts and 
advertising staff so that a media outlet can eventually be self-sustaining. On-going 
financial support for operations is sometimes provided. As well, Canada and other 
Western governments fund organizations that supply media content, such as those 
that write scripts for broadcast in the developing world,7 and religious organizations 
that broadcast content.8 While these groups are not journalistic per se, they engage
6 Many training interventions ate short-term initiatives in which a Canadian trainer is flown to a country to present
seminars and workshops. Training initiatives are also situational in that a Western donor state supplies trainers 
for, say, TV coverage of an election. Canada has funded trainers for election broadcasts in various states includ­
ing South A&ica.
7 http://www.farmradio.org/eng/scripts.php#subjectl3
8 As examples, some of the Canadian religious organizations that receive media assistance from CIDA include the
Oblats, The Jesuits, The United Church of Canada. Source: Government of Canada, Parliamentary Library.
5
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in a kind of current affairs journalism that penetrates civil society. Media assistance 
can also be defined as the support and development of the social and political envi­
ronment in which a plural independent media can be developed. This level is itself 
very broad with merging and overlapping interests and promotion strategies. Exam­
ples of this level o f media assistance are interventions that promote the rule o f law 
and media rights within the legal system, and the development of civil society and an 
awareness of the media's role within it. In the main, this study examines media as­
sistance interventions having a clear journalistic focus.
Today's web of media assistance interventions has two clear antecedents. The 
first antecedent is the history of the development of the Western concept of journal­
ism itself. In the political culture of the West the media has acquired nearly unas­
sailable status. Independent media are held to be fundamental to democracy, civil 
society and good governance. The prevailing assumption in the West is that the me­
dia are liberal pluralist; journalists are generally expected to be autonomous of the 
state, from business, and from interest groups with a legitimate function in a "multi­
part conversation among citizens and political institutions".9 Furthermore, in the 
West the news media are also held to be a guarantor of citizens' rights -  the cele­
brated watchdog function of the media. The rights of Western media are firmly es­
tablished in jurisprudence through case law on libel, slander and fair comment, and 
courts continue to clash with the media in the West over the protection of journalistic 
sources to the point where reporters are jailed for not revealing information in the 
course of an investigation. As well, an organic set of media principals and ethics
9 Lydia Miljan, Hidden Agendas: How Journalists Influence the News. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 12
6
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have emerged in the Western states to regulate and guide media practitioners in their 
work. Western governments have also formally retained regulatory authority over 
the content and actions o f radio and television media through licensing conditions, 
which legitimize the role and function of the electronic media. All o f these factors 
combine to make the media a mature, important and powerful component of the po­
litical system of the West. How the media attained this status is well-known. The 
principles o f free speech date back centuries. With advances in printing, pamphle­
teers and journalists such as Paine and Brissot emerged to influence events during 
the American and French Revolutions respectively. Tocqueville wrote of newspa­
pers as a civil bond that linked 19th century Americans to a distant government while 
also providing a forum in which political news was disseminated. The press, Toc­
queville said, "makes political life circulate... forces men to come in turn to appear 
before the court of opinion. It rallies interests around certain doctrines and formu­
lates the creeds of the parties. Through it they speak to each other without being put 
in contact."10 Successive Western journalists, scholars, jurists and leaders have ce­
mented this bond between free speech, the media and the citizenry. Today's Western 
journalist consequently owes her privileges to a lengthy historical process -  some­
times a struggle -  over the rights of free speech.11 The process establishing the 
rights and functions of the modem media has therefore been symbiotic with the proc­
ess of democratization, the construction of civil society and the development o f good 
governance in Western political culture.
10 Alexis de Tocqueville,, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 2000)
11 For an examination of how Canada's modem broadcast system emerged, see David Ellis, F.volation of the 
Canadian Broadcasting System: Objectives and Realities. 1928-1968 (Hull: Government of Canada, 1979)
7
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Yet, the function of the media continues to be the subject of much academic de­
bate in the West. Scholars debate the influence the media have in our lives, whether 
the media's influence is positive, neutral, or negative; how the personal points-of- 
view of owners, managers and journalists infuse their reporting; which issues they 
select to make prominent; what agendas, if any, they set, how they frame stories,12 
how the media affect our perceptions and the way they alter our interaction with fel­
low citizens and the world.13 That Western media are truly liberal-pluralist, is debat­
able. Nonetheless, even while this debate on the influence of the news media rages 
unresolved in the West, media modeled along Western lines have been and continue 
to be actively promoted in the developing world through Western governments' ODA 
strategies. Canada, the United States and European governments do so through their 
ODA delivery agencies and subsequently through NGOs.14 To put it simply, the 
strategy of media assistance assumes that if it worked in the West, it should work in 
the developing world.
The second antecedent of modern media assistance is found in the history of me­
dia assistance itself. The concept of media assistance evolved partially from tech­
nology transfer: with the transfer of developed world technologies -  first the printing 
press, then radio, TV and now new media -  to the developing world, Western jour­
nalistic principles and Western journalism's role in political development have natu­
12 See Chomsky, Cooper, Miljan, Nesbitt-Larking, Putnam, Soroka, Winter, et al.
13 Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: Penguin,
1985) and Putnam, Robert, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2000).
14 Canada (CIDA), United States (USAID); Others: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA); Danish International Development Assistance (DANIDA), Stiftungen (Germany); From 1992-1997 the 
EU=PHARE (Poland Hungary Association for the Reconstruction of the Economy) and TACIS (Technical As­
sistance to the Commonwealth on Independent States) Democracy Programmes (Known together as PTDP);
8
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rally accompanied the technology.15 The colonizing state transferred communica­
tions technology (first print, then electronic) and programming for the benefit o f its 
colonists. Although the content and style were targeted at colonists there was a spill 
over effect on the indigenous population. Developing world journalists learned a 
specific skill-set -  an operator's manual for the technology transferred by mimicking 
the practices o f Western journalism. But media assistance took on a more coherent 
strategic identity during the rapid de-colonization of the 1950s and 1960s. Recipient 
states called on Western trainers to teach journalism skills because of the "urgency 
with which ex-colonial nations wished to indigenize and expand broadcasting".16 
The developing nations requested help and they got it. Also, students from the de­
veloping world studied in the West and returned home, supposedly imbued with 
Western journalistic principles through cultural adaptation and professional educa­
tion.17 The process of "Westernizing" developing world media had begun because 
there are "contextual values and assumptions built into the very ethos of media pro­
fessionalism as it is transferred to developing countries."18 Due to this, it was inevi­
table that mass communication and journalism in much of the developing world 
should have a Western structure.19 However, the great hope of a nationalist news 
media in Africa structured along Western lines, once allied with and celebrated by 
the leaders of independence movements during the struggle for liberation and imme­
15 Peter Golding, “Media Professionalism in the Third World: The Transfer of an Ideology,” in Mass Commnnica- 
tion and Society, ed. James Curran, Gurevtich, M and Woolacott, J. (New York: Arnold, 1977), 292
16 Golding, 296
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diately after, became viewed as "treacherous” by the same leaders until today media 
freedom is widely restricted -  even more so than it was under colonization.20 Indeed, 
many of the great post-colonial African leaders, such as Nyerere, Kenyatta and 
Azikiwe were themselves either journalists or publishers before leading Tanzania, 
Kenya and Nigeria respectively. Unfortunately, media rights and the progress of 
democratization, civil society and good governance have declined in these three 
countries and others in Africa since independence despite early optimism, a media 
infrastructure bequeathed by the colonizer and assistance interventions post­
independence.21
Thus, these two antecedents -  promotion of “Western style” media based on the 
assumption that media principles are universal, and the developing world’s willing­
ness to copy Western political development, dovetailed into the modem media assis­
tance strategy that can be traced back half a century. Its strategic origins were 
clearly a component of Western governments' developmental models - the "antisep­
tic"22, linear, universal, orthodox theory that was postulated in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s in response to what Huntington calls the "second short wave" of democ­
ratization,23 intentionally following the Western path to political development.
Media assistance in the development theory o f the time was to be used to "alter
20 Kingsley O. Harbor, “The Mass Media and Stability in Africa,” in Contending Issues in African Development 
Advances, Challenges and the Future, ed. Obioma M. Ihedru (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 2001), 53.
21 The result? Tanzanian media were limited and tightly controlled into the mid-1990s and are today emerging, but 
with restrictions still in place in many parts of the country. Kenya has a tenuous grasp on democracy now but a 
media community that deferred to the state under Mai has freed government sanctions as recently as 2003 and 
continues to be closely monitored. Nigeria has a vibrant media community but it is a sate that has been wracked 
by internal conflict and human rights abuses. As in Kenya, restrictive regulations have recently been selectively 
imposed on the Nigerian media Nigeria is one of the most dangerous places on earth for journalists to work. All 
three countries are deemed today to be only partly free.
22 Howard Wiarda, Non-Western Theories of Development: Regional Norms versus Global Trends. (Fort Worth,
TX: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 3.
23 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late 20th Century. (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 16.
10
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dia assistance in the development theory of the time was to be used to "alter attitudes 
and values" and, consistent with the spirit o f the time, indicators of success would lie 
in cold, hard facts, such as the number of televisions and radios per capita necessary 
for development.24 The appointment of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) in 1961 illustrates how foreign policy, foreign aid, 
propaganda and the media merged into the developmental theory that defined the 
times.25 Murrow's USIA was in the business of promoting the United States' political 
agenda. In doing so it also promoted Western media principles through funding of 
journalism schools26, the training of journalists and the distribution o f content. In 
this way the media "were agents of both nation-building and of enlarging that nation 
into a union of nations -  politically, culturally or economically conceived."27 Media 
assistance had become an intrinsic part of the larger objectives of the development 
model. The former colonial masters were as active as USAID was. For example, the 
United Kingdom and France continued to export Western technology and journalistic 
practices and principles through the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the 
Societe de Radiodiffussion de la France d'Outre-Mer (SORAFAM) and later l'Office 
de Cooperation Radiophonique (OCORA) respectively.28 The BBC sent a small 
army o f trainers abroad to the United Kingdom’s former colonies in the 1950s.29 Yet
24 Srebemy-Mohammadi, Annabelle, in Mass Media and Society. 2nd edition., ed. James Curran and Michael Gure- 
vitch. (London: Arnold 1996), 178-179
25 Joseph E. Persico. Edward R. Murrow: An American Original. (New York: Dell, 1988), 471.
26 Nigeria’s first journalism training institution, the Jackson College of Journalism in the University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, was established in this way; source: Jimada, 370
27 Michael Gurevitch, "The Globalization of Electronic Journalism" in Mass Media and Society. 2nd edition, ed.
James Curran and Michael Gurevitch (London: Arnold 1996), 207
28 For a list of some projects and participation in 1960s and 70s see Golding 296-297
29 Jimada, 370
11
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as the overall normative process of orthodox development became widely rejected, 
criticisms "largely passed by mass communications."30 The promotion of the media 
in the developing world, seen to be fundamental to political development as it is in 
the West, was apparently immune from widespread criticism, even as other associ­
ated strategies appeared to fail. Consistently, media assistance strategies have faced 
limited critical review, even as Western governments, in particular the United States, 
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2.2 Media assistance in political development today
As noted, a justification for media assistance interventions is that the development of a 
Westem-style news media can aid in political transition. More specifically, the media have 
a role to play in the promotion of democratization, of good governance and of civil society, 
the development of which also aids in the advancement of human rights, and, in certain 
cases contributes to peace building. Each of these aspects of media assistance theory are 
addressed in turn, below.
2.2.1 The media in the promotion of democratization, good governance and civil society 
Democratization
In the early 1990s, as newly freed nations embraced political liberation following the 
end of the Cold War, scholars took a renewed look at why and how promotion strategies 
should be employed. In 1992 Diamond offered the following justifications for the United 
States to actively promote democratization in its national interest: democratization can re­
duce armed threats, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; democrati­
zation can lead to the peaceful resolution of conflict; democratization can open economies, 
thereby leading to wider prosperity, access to resources and freer trade; democratization 
can advance cooperation in dealing with unconventional challenges such as the illegal trade 
in drugs and environmental degradation; foreigners studying, working and traveling abroad 
are safer in democracies; democratic countries rarely go to war with each other or sponsor 
terrorism against other democracies.32 In sum, the presumption is that democracies are far 
more reliable, stable partners than nations governed under other systems. But the distance 
between theory and reality is often vast. Attempting to define the process of democratiza­
32Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy 87 (1992): 28-30.
13
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tion in a concise, brief summary is a nearly impossible task.33 Many typologies, defini­
tions, spectra, groups, classifications and indices have been assembled in the search for the 
formula of democratic development. States differ and democratic transitions are irregular. 
Whitehead reminds us to consider both democracy and democratization in the "light of 
their 'really existing' manifestations"34 because the process of democratization is a complex, 
lengthy and non-linear process; there is no one-size fits-all process, no template of forms 
and institutions required to achieve it.35 In fact, seeking linear schemes of causal connec­
tion may be "unhelpful".36 The process of democratization must be viewed from a long 
historical perspective: it is complex, long-term, dynamic, and open-ended.37
Nonetheless, even though the process of democratization is "floating", it can be "an­
chored".38 That one or more of the minimum conditions in transition models such as 
Dahl's, Karl's and Schmitter's39 are often violated in today's emerging democracies chal­
lenges, however, conventional models. A new theory may be needed if these states are to 
make the transition to, and consolidate democracy 40 Thus, free and independent media
33 In the The Third Ware. Huntington consumes eight pages discussing just the m ating of democracy. Huntington,
5-13
34 Lawrence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7.
35 Kevin Quigjey, “Democracy Assistance in South-East Asia: Long History/Unfinished Business” in Democracy 




39 Minimum conditions: 1. Control of government is constitutionally vested in public officials, 2. Elected officials are 
chosen in frequent and fair elections, 3. Universal adult suffrage, 4. Practically anyone is entitled to run for office,
5. Freedom of expression, 6. Citizens have a right to seek alternative information and alternative sources of in­
formation exist and are protected by law, 7. Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitution­
ally vested authority without resistance from the bureaucracy, and 8. The polity must be self-governing; it must be 
sovereign in the international order.39 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven Conn: Yak 
University, 1971; Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lyn Karl, What Democracy Is and Isn't in the Global Resurgence o f Democ­
racy, Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993)
40 Whitehead, 28
14
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may indeed be one of the theoretical anchors that attaches the many floating states41 each 
with their own distinct characteristics, to the development of democracy.
What might the role of the media be then in a new theory of democratization? If a 
community of reflexive and cognitive citizens need exist - they must have the potential to 
participate "with some minimum degree of cognitive competence" that is, and the pool 
must not be too exclusive, then the media has a role in this: Individuals must first have 
cognition that they are citizens of a plural state; further, they must form shared understand­
ing "about the nature of politics and the procedures of political dialogue" 42 Here again is 
the media's space in the non-linear, open-ended theory of democratization. The consensus 
is that at die very least the right - protected by law -  to seek alternative information and 
alternative sources o f information is a skeletal underpinning of democratic development.
Also, because of questions surrounding fairness and equity of participation, emphasis in 
the promotion of democratization has moved away from "dramatic innovations" like elec­
tions to the political environment in which democracy develops.43 Here is found justifica­
tion for media assistance interventions in today's democratization promotion literature. For 
example, democratization according to CIDA's definition "involves building democratic 
institutions and practices and deepening democratic values in societies". The media are an 
intrinsic part of this for CIDA: "[A] free media can simultaneously challenge public action 
while serving as both an alternate information source and an educational tool"44 One of 
CIDA's twenty "Types of interventions" is to "build the role of an independent, responsible
41 Freedom of expression being one of Schmitter and Karl’s minimum conditions.
42 Whitehead, 17
43 Peter Burnell, "Democracy Assistance: The State of the Art" in Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation 
for Democratization, ed. Peter Burnell (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 349
44 Government of Canada. CIDA. Policy For CIDA on Human Rights. Democratization and Good Governance — 
Democratization. Ottawa: 1996. Available from http://www.acdi-ida.gc.ca/cida_ind.
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media through training, technical assistance and linkages between journalists."45 However, 
we must be cognizant that the role of the media in transition should undergo scrutiny as the 
transition paradigm shifts 46 In other words, a one-size-fits-all media strategy may not be 
universally applicable. Modem media technology can, it seems, play an important role in 
the democratization process. A charismatic leader can use the modem tools of communica­
tion, replete with sound-bites, in the ‘theatre’ of transition to advance comprehension and 
aid in persuasion.47 But technology can also be misused, including by disreputable journal­
ists.
Good Governance
CIDA defines good governance as "the exercise o f power by various levels of 
government that is effective, honest, equitable, transparent and accountable".48 More 
specifically, CIDA includes sound economic policies, professional and effective pub­
lic services, an independent judiciary, low levels of corruption, fiscal probity and ac­
countability, and appropriate levels o f military spending and military participation in 
civilian life, as components of good governance. Corruption can hinder both eco­
nomic and political development, of course, but more importantly in terms of this 
analysis, the less corrupt a country, the more likely it is that ODA will be effective, 
according to the World Bank.49 But promoting good governance is, like democracy 
promotion, a complex task. Governments are not monolithic. Depending on the 
structure of polity, governments have many different vertical and horizontal levels
45 Government of Canada., 7.
46 Thomas Carothers, “The End o f the Transition Paradigm ’’Journal o f Democracy 13.1 (2002): 5-21.
47 Whitehead, 50.
48 Government o f Canada., 14
49 World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works. What Doesn't and Why. (New York: World Bank, 1998), n. pag.
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and connections, checks and balances. There is the constitutional level, the execu­
tive level, the electoral system level the legislative level, the bureaucratic level and 
the judicial level. Today's good governance promotion theory embraces a multi­
sector strategy targeting institution building, civil service reform, accountability and 
transparency, with donor states selectively concentrating aid across these areas per 
their individual ODA strategies.50 The result is a patchwork of emphases. Where the 
news media intersects with good governance in promotion literature is mainly in the 
function of monitor. Monitoring politicians is one o f Whitehead's three defences 
against the abuse of money power in democratic politics, the other two being the rule 
of law and the "competition" in free elections perceived as "clean" by voters. 
Whitehead observes, "The citizenry or the electorate in a democratic society should 
be able to monitor the behavior of the politicians through a free and competitive 
press."51 The news media thus have the capacity to alter public perception of 
corruption. For the transition to succeed, the public must gain "confidence that, 
despite individual scandals, an underlying 'ethic of responsibility' can be 
discerned".52 On the other hand, the media can also reinforce the public’s perception 
that government is corrupt. As the transition proceeds, citizens are therefore able to 
make decisions based on whether they perceive their government to be honest or 
corrupt. However, establishing free, independent and plural media to check 
government integrity is not easily accomplished. Transparency International, an 
NGO working in the area of good governance, reminds us that the independence of 
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of concern in countries where corruption is high. In developing world states, inde­
pendent media can be brought to heel by government. Permits and licenses may be 
withdrawn or withheld. Censorship may be invoked. On the other hand, media in­
dependence is influenced by ownership. In many countries the media owners have 
diverse business interests that frequently bring them close to civil servants and lead­
ing politicians.53 Private ownership can clearly distort the monitoring function o f the 
media in the developing world as it does in the West. Likewise, one should not as­
sume either that publicly-funded news media in the developing world are less biased 
than the privately controlled media. This causes concern for Transparency Interna­
tional as well: "A free press must be utterly free of government control. This de­
mands ending the "phony excuses for supporting state-owned media, as if they alone 
can best serve the public interest".34 The recent history of media development in 
transitional states shows this “uneasy partnership” between journalism and the state. 
Poland is one example where state-owned media have used justification of protecting 
‘national culture’ to become the central players in the electronic medium, yet it is the 
government that makes political appointments to state radio and television.55 Can the 
state broadcaster be trusted then to act independently o f government and perform its 
function as monitor? Transparency International is blunt: "Wherever the state owns 
the media the temptation arises for politicians to abuse their power -  and the dangers
53 Frank Vogl, Curbing Corruption: The Media's Work, Recommendations for Action. Section 5 - Media Ownership, 
(Berlin: Transparency International, 1999).
54 Vogl, n pag.
55 Wierzynski, Maciej, Aspen, 18 The same criticism is leveled at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Board of 
Directors which has been stacked with political appointees over the years. Even the Presidency of the CBC has 
become politicized. Current President Robert Rabinovitch and former President Perrin Beatty were both closely 
tied to the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party respectively, which were in office when each was appointed.
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are especially great in the countries where the private media is (sic) far weaker than 
the state's media organs".56 
Civil Society
Like democracy and good governance, civil society and its components are 
varied and complex. Civil society is a fluctuating concept that reflects the distinct 
characteristics of the political community in which it functions. At its simplest level 
civil society is the "sphere between the state and its citizens, in which a variety of 
voluntary and autonomous organizations exist and seek to protect the interests of 
their members".57 Continuing to gather more components over time, modern civil 
society includes a plethora of media organizations, organized labour affiliates, pro­
fessional associations, voluntary groups, religious societies and literally thousands of 
NGOs. Furthermore, the sphere of relationships between the state and its citizens 
continues to be altered by the pursuit and attainment of rights. The 1948 Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights is a seminal document that gave momentum to a global 
rights agenda which has been building since then, with only isolated state specific 
and regional setbacks. Rights have certainly become intrinsic to the Canadian politi­
cal identity. According to Michael Ignatieff, Canada has one of the most distinct 
rights cultures in the world: "Canada has moved away from constitutional debates 
dominated by government and first ministers to a system of constitutional renewal
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driven essentially by citizens, interest groups and nations".58 This national experi­
ence is perhaps reflected in Canadian aid policy.
Traditionally, literature has overwhelmingly asserted a normative relationship be­
tween civil society and political development. Where a strong civil society is present, 
democracy should be easier and more durable, "where it is absent or weak, democra­
tization would be precarious".59 The free choice of individuals to interact with others 
in society and influence politics is an established liberal tradition. But civil society 
lacks clarity and consistency. Therefore it is difficult to discern power relations 
within it. Carothers cautions against assuming that there are only positive benefits 
accruing from the development and expansion of civil society.60
The predominant roles of the media in civil society theory are in maintaining its 
two traditional functions of watchdog (or guarantor) and conduit o f information. As 
watchdog of government, they are a guarantor of liberal rights, of which the free as­
sociation of individuals and their right to participate in the political system under­
score the principles of civil society. Diamond is unequivocal: "Wider, freer, more 
open and independent flows o f information are the indispensable foundation for civil 
society checks against the abuse of state power."61 Whitehead reinforces this: the 
independent sphere of voluntary associations must guarantee each other's independ-
58 Michael Igantieff, The Rights Revolution. (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2000), 7.
59 Whitehead, 69
60 Thomas Carothers, “Civil Society;” Foreign Policy 117 (1999): 18-24+26-29. At the present tune this criticism 
seems lost on CIDA which continues to extol the virtues of promoting civil society in the developing world — 
again a reflection, perhaps, of national experience.
61 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
1999), 240.
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ence through "principles of autonomy and mutual respect."62 The news media can 
thus guarantee civil society two ways. For Diamond they act as the guarantor of 
civil society rights against the state, and for Whitehead the media guarantee the 
rights of the members of civil society to remain autonomous within civil society.
As a conduit of information the news media have two important functions in the 
advancement of civil society: the news media's actions keep the information flowing 
between the distinct parts of civil society itself and, the news media channels infor­
mation from the civil society up the line to government in undertaking "both 'advo­
cacy' and 'watchdog' roles, i.e. to channel public opinion to government and advocate 
for policy change as well as to scrutinize its activities".63
But the Western concept of journalism often fits “awkwardly” in civil society.64 
Is social responsibility the role of the journalist? That is, should journalism serve to 
build civic consciousness and social solidarity, or even economic development, all of 
which may contribute to the development of civil society? Or is the role of journalist 
strictly independent -  a more libertarian model that emphasizes the independence of 
journalists and asserts the primacy of free speech and free expression while acting as 
watchdog? While other member groups of civil society may have clear and simple 
roles and responsibilities within civil society, journalism is a more complex compo­
nent of it, reflecting often the individual attitudes and opinions o f the journalists 
themselves, or the organization that employs them. In the developing world the 
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vivid. Given that even Western conventions acknowledge restrictions on journalistic 
independence may be imposed occasionally so as to maintain national security, pub­
lic security, rights, the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and the like,65 can 
journalists in the developing world be expected to function with the same or even 
more freedom than in the West, when the challenges and threats to political devel­
opment are greater?66 Thus, where journalists fit into developing world civil society 
and how they function within it may be case-specific. For example, authoritar­
ian/totalitarian states have limited civil societies, obviously, and post-transition so­
cieties have only nascent associative structures. In transitional states of the develop­
ing world there can also be strong forces militating against the establishment of civil 
society. Clan, ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions may reinforce group conflict. 
Members of a transitional society who held social capital and the densest associative 
life under the old regime can use these relationships to "defend privilege and margin­
alize the less well-endowed majority" post-transition.67 Although the media’s func­
tion, in theory, is to break down privilege and de-marginalize the less well-endowed 
majority, is it able to? Or, will it, given the privileged position of members of the 
media themselves?
The "globalization" of civil society is one way that resistance to the development 
of civil society may be broken down. The media can play a role in this by enhancing 
communications between far-flung reaches of the globe, thereby working to 
eliminate isolation among states. Globalization in this context implies inevitability
45 For example, see European Convention on Human Rights, article 10, Section 2
46 Take, for example, Uganda where a journalist has been charged with sedition following broadcasts he made ques­
tioning the role of the Ugandan government in the death of a Sudanese politician. The sedition charges were jus­
tified by the Ugandan president as necessary to preserve regional security.
47 Whitehead, 77.
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nate isolation among states. Globalization in this context implies inevitability that 
civil societies will emerge within the nations of the world through the embrace of an 
international associative community, such as that seen in the new awareness stimu­
lated by peace and ecological movements.68 Whitehead sees an incipient 'interna­
tional civil society' in the emerging network of "specialists, lobbyists, activists and 
practitioners" working with standards and operational notions about the enforcement 
of human rights and their linkages to democratization69 — a fitting description of the 
media trainers and NGOs supported by the Canadian government. In theory, the 
concept of media assistance aligns with this ‘international civil society’: a "fragile 
basis for the generation of coherent norms that could then be authoritatively imple­
mented by international institutions."70 Still, the application of universal journalistic 
norms, regardless of the institutions that are implementing them, are compelled to 
take into consideration the reality that the social good of free expression depends on 
the social context of the developing state.71 Furthermore, the news media occupy an 
ambiguous space in civil society theory. It has autonomous identity in civil society 
as an associative organization with membership restricted to an exclusive group of 
individuals, journalists, who have their own interests and rights to protect in their 
relations with other players within civil society and with the government. At the 
same time the news media has an autonomous function in the sphere between the 
state and its citizens. Indeed, the news media are the very conduit through which 
many citizens interact with the state outside o f citizen-bureaucracy relations. Priori­
68 John Keane, Global Civil Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 1.
69 Whitehead, 24.
70 Whitehead, 24.
71 Sheila Coronet, interview with author, 27 July 2005.
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tizing issues on the public agenda, enabling the flow of official and emergency in­
formation, presenting analysis, the balancing of opinions are all tasks performed by 
the media in the West. It is a powerful position tempered only by legal recourse and 
the integrity o f the individuals who practice the craft of journalism.
In the developing world the role of journalists in the promotion of 
democratization, good governance and civil society is far less certain than in the 
West. There are many factors that mitigate the function of the media. Journalists 
themselves may hinder political transition. Whitehead comments that under 
authoritarians journalists may defend the principles of legality and oppose censorship, 
but in "a more relaxed and liberal environment" they may champion reforms that 
facilitate "capture" by their colleagues or resist changes that threaten their 
prerogatives.72 Given that the members of the Western news media are themselves 
not uniformly immune from bias, dishonest practices or from succumbing to 
influence, it follows that developing world journalists are not either. The tentacles of 
clientilism reach deep into the newsrooms o f the developing world.73 The low wages 
paid to developing world journalists have been identified by Transparency 
International as increasing their susceptibility to bribery,74 altering journalists' 
function. Ownership is another important distinction to be considered when studying 
the news media in the developing world. To borrow an example, it may be legal for 
a wealthy family to establish a newspaper to discredit its enemies in the developing 
world but, legal or not, this practice does not fit Whitehead’s definitions of'dual
72 Whitehead, 111.
73 In the Philippines, for example, members of the journalistic community joke openly about the practice of 'envel- 
opmental journalism' where payoffs from politicians to journalists in exchange for favourable coverage are com­
monplace.
74 Vogl, Strengthening. 10.
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practice does not fit Whitehead’s definitions of 'dual autonomy' and 'civility' that de­
fine civil society.75 A wealthy family can gain undue influence through the owner­
ship of media because balancing mechanisms such as competition have not yet ma­
tured. The same practice in the West, however, may not violate dual autonomy and 
civility to the same extent. For example, in Canada the Asper family has been ac­
cused of using its media holdings to promote their political point of view. Yet they 
are not viewed as overly threatening to civil society. Why? First, news consumers 
may be fully aware of the point o f views being expressed by the owners and they 
may even share the same point of view. Second, there is competition in the Canadian 
news media with an array of alternative points of view available in private and public 
news media.
2.2.2 The media in the promotion of human rights and peace building
Along with aiding democratization, good governance and civil society, there are 
two other prominent areas of political development that the Canadian government 
asserts media assistance can help promote: human rights and peace building.
A hierarchical ranking of human rights is an arbitrary process dependent on the 
unique characteristics of a given society. In a failed state the rights to sustenance, 
shelter and security may trump other rights of political freedom, at least until the 
state is on the way to political development. The promotion o f human rights is also 
complicated by a seemingly ever-growing list of what constitutes a human right.
This can lead to “paralysis” when trying to equalize rights across diverse cultures 
and states; rather, core rights of basic security and subsistence are more attainable
75 Whitehead, 83.
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and more relevant in many states, while the advanced political rights contained in 
Western-driven human rights covenants are elusive.76 However, in a society that has 
overcome the challenges of security and subsistence and aspires to be democratic, 
pursuing the rights o f free speech and access to free media is crucial.77 The justifica­
tion for the promotion of free speech and free media as fundamental to political de­
velopment has been bolstered by the progress of universal human rights in the latter 
half of the 20th Century. Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared "freedom of speech 
and expression -  everywhere in the world" (my italics) one of his four essential hu­
man freedoms in a 1941 address to the U.S. Congress.78 In 1948, the right to free 
media was enshrined in Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights:
Everyone has the right to freedom o f opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless o f frontiers.
This declaration marks an important advancement in the theory of media develop­
ment. Not only was the human right to free speech asserted as it had been for two 
centuries, but now access to "media" was deemed to be a human right also, echoing 
Roosevelt. The signatories to this declaration were committing their states to the 
principle of media access. The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights fol­
lowed the UN example in stating the right to “receive and impart ideas and informa­
76 Tom Keenleyside, "Aiding Rights: Canada and the Advancement of Human Dignity,” in Canadian International 
Development Assistance, ed. Cranford Pratt (Montreal: McGill -Queen's University Press, 1994), 243.
77 Anthea Jeffery, “Free Speech and Press: An absolute Right?” Human Rights Quarterly L8:2 (1986): 197
78 http:// www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs36b.htm
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tion without interference”.79 In the following decades, these and other similar decla­
rations were included in the re-working of many states’ constitutions to reflect this 
wording and media rights advanced, albeit often slowly. As stated above, with the 
end of the Cold War in 1989 accelerated impetus was placed on the development of 
freedom of expression and freedom of information as a universal human right. To 
this end, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) organizes seminars on freedom of the press and independent and plural­
istic media from which key reference texts have been developed and adopted by 
member states.80 Access to media is a pillar of UNDP Human Development Report, 
Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World: A Free Independent Media.81 Fol­
lowing the lead of the United Nations (UN), donor governments accordingly looked 
to media development as a component of post-Cold War ODA. Critics o f corporate 
domination of the media argue, though, that the human right of access to the media 
should be awft'-corporate in essence; that grassroots media should be encouraged 
while limits are placed on private ownership due to the increasing concentration of 
media ownership.82 The debate over whether the human right of access to media is 
best served through private or public sector journalism is not officially engaged by
79 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10 available at: 
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Eur Convention/euroconv.html. It is noted that the European Convention also in­
cludes important caveats outlining situations in which these rights may be abrogated so, in effect, even the Euro­
pean states do not permit complete media freedom.
80 United Nations; UNESCO, available at http://portal.unesco.org/. Note: UNESCO has been active in media 
development for many years. For example, the 1980 UNESCO document Many Voices, One World; Towards a new, 
more just and more efficient world information and communication order. Report by the International Commision for the Study of 
Communication Problems (Paris, 1980), also known as the MacBride report MacBride’s recommendations were a 
casualty of the Cold War.
81 United Nations. UNDP available from http://www.undp.org/.
82 Mark Rendeiro, Global Communications Governance: The Next Step in the Evolution of Human Rights, avail­
able from www.bicyclemark.org.
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CIDA. Although there may be a perceived preference for supporting public sector 
broadcasting because present and former Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
employees have often been tasked as trainers and the CBC itself has been invited by 
CIDA to devise training curricula, CIDA trains and supports journalists through 
NGOs indiscriminately.83 CIDA apparently does not judge whom to train.
The concept o f ‘peace building’ in post-conflict states is another way that donors 
justify media assistance interventions.84 CIDA has commissioned a study of the me­
dia and peace-building, which is useful for academics but shows limited evidence of 
practical application to date.85 New York University’s Center for War, Peace and 
News Media acknowledges that there “is not yet a substantial body o f scholarship 
that investigates what role the media conceivably could play in preventing or amelio­
rating international or intra-state conflict”.86 What literature that does exist on the 
media and peace-building focuses on aspects such as de-escalation-oriented conflict 
coverage, strengthening of civil society and demolition of stereotypes and prejudice 
which, it is acknowledged, cannot be achieved by simply spreading a new ideology 
“determined by harmony and cooperative ideals.”87 Still, one finds in peace-building 
theory consistent rhetoric extolling the media’s potential to bridge huge gaps be­
tween previously warring sides almost instantaneously, to build understanding by
83 Anecdotally, Canada and the European governments tend to support public broadcasting whereas the United 
States supports the private sector. That is the assessment of Bosnian media interventions by Canadian aid worker 
John Fraser who was there with NDI.
84 Howard, 13.
85 Government of Canada. CIDA. An operational framework for Media and Peacebuilding available from 
http: /  /  www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/
86 New York University Center for War, Peace and News Media http://wwwJiyu.edu/cwpnm/media_conflicthtml
87 Wilhelm Kempf, Media Contribution to Peace in War-Torn Societies. (The Hague: Nethedands Institute of Inter­
national Relations 'Clingendael', 1998), 10.
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presenting the ‘other side’s’ point of view88 as if long-standing animosities and his­
toric memory can be erased by preparing and presenting revisionist documentaries on 
television, or holding seminars, workshops and colloquia for journalists. What 
seems reasonably attainable, however, is a ratcheting- down o f the rhetoric associ­
ated with the media in a conflict -  the side-taking tendencies inherent in developing 
world journalism. Studio Ijambo, a media assistance intervention in Burundi, 
showed that media assistance can, at the very least, strengthen the belief that dia­
logue is the only solution to resolving conflict.89 Still, the ultimate goal o f media 
assistance, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
a strategy document cited by CIDA as a source for its media assistance interventions, 
"should be to develop a range of diverse mediums and voices that are credible, and to 
create and strengthen a sector that promotes such outlets",90 further illustrating the 
lofty expectations attached to media assistance interventions. But, as with all con­
flicts journalists can “either make or break the peace with what and how they report 
events and activities, especially in something complicated like a peace process”.91 
Therefore, the assumption that media assistance strategies focusing on peace­
building will yield only positive outcomes is flawed.
88 Norbert Ropers, “Peace-Building, Crisis Preventions and Conflict Management” in Technical Cooperation in the 
Context of Crises Conflicts and Disasters, (Eschbom, 2002), 65.
89 Asgede Hagos, Media Intervention in Peace Building in Burundi — The Studio limbo Experience and Impact. 
Washington: Management Systems International (2001): iii
90 Government of Canada. CIDA. The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach. (1999): 3
91 Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Telling the Truth of the “Other”: Images of Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Pasig 
City, Philippines: Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process 2000).
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2.3 NGO Literature
The Canadian government delivers much of its ODA through CIDA via NGO s.
The body of literature on NGO participation in political development is large and 
continues to grow as the participation of NGOs in political development expands. I 
limit discussion of NGO literature at this point to the intersection of NGOs with de­
mocratization, civil society and good governance promotion in contemporary context. 
(A later section examines more closely some of the NGOs Canada supports through 
media assistance interventions.) NGOs come in a wide variety of types, from fun­
damentally religious to rigidly secular, from apolitical humanist, to activist partisan 
elitist. The big multinational organizations that work in the areas of democratization, 
civil society and good governance promotion are well known: Article 19, Amnesty 
International, Freedom House, Transparency International, International PEN, Re­
porters Without Borders (more commonly known by the French acronym RSF), etc.92 
Domestic NGOs, including Community-Based Organizations (CBOs), are linked 
with their international counterparts in this loosely knit theoretical coalition called 
the NGO community. There are also many organizations constantly in formation or 
in disintegration that could conceivably be part o f the NGO community and are never 
recognized as such.
There is evidence that the presence of an active NGO community can help pro­
mote world democratization, civil society and good governance. Where there is an 
absence of active governmental impetus and private philanthropy, NGOs can fill the
92 NGOs are cited as they are used in this study. A complete list of NGOs cited in this study is attached.
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gap.93 For example, in the Philippines, where there is a vibrant civil society and a 
relatively high degree of media freedom and democracy, there are thousands of 
NGOs.94 The Philippines is but one developing state with characteristics all its own, 
including a relatively open society, albeit one that faces the challenges of terrorist 
insurgencies and irregular turnovers of government. In more closed, even less stable 
societies, the delivery of ODA through NGOs is challenging. Keane sums it up: 
"Matters are worsened by the tyranny of distance: despite the noblest of public- 
spirited motives, decision-makers tend to lose track of their decisions which whiz 
around in a cyclotron o f global structures and events with many different and unpre­
dictable effects."95 Consequently, the reliance on NGOs to deliver aid, though moti­
vated by a desire to deliver aid more effectively through individuals who are more 
familiar with local conditions and issues than distant bureaucrats, is a policy fraught 
with inconsistencies. For example, how democratic are the NGOs themselves? Dia­
mond refers to the "voice" of NGOs, but who is doing the talking? Is it the West or 
is it indigenous society? Is it neither? International Non-governmental Organiza­
tions (INGOs) may have their own agendas.96 Critics contend that these organiza­
tions do have their own social and political motives and are often more concerned 
with their “own interests than in the needs of those whom they purport to serve”; in 
other words, NGOs exist only to self-perpetuate, and they often send ill-prepared in­
dividuals into countries they know little about.97 Furthermore, if the grassroots are
93 Diamond, 252.
94 Quigley, 272
95 Keane, Global Civil Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 116.
96 Diamond, 253
97 Andreas Harsono, Aspen, 16
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not even allowed a voice within their own governments, can they have a voice within 
the international non-governmental community? There is also much suspicion that 
NGOs "tend to lack the surrounding ethos, the sense of authenticity, and the spirit of 
autonomy celebrated by theorists of civil society".98 For civil society to factor into 
the process of political development, it must be more than just a cluster of NGOs; the 
NGOs cannot be relied upon to assure each other's autonomy nor constrain authori­
tarians, writes Whitehead. Critics note also the "cycle of international enthusiasm" 
of NGOs. There is a great deal o f attention paid to a particular crisis when it appears 
on the global radar screen, but some NGOs have a tendency to get involved only to 
move on to the next state in crisis when it occurs.99 This undermines the long-term 
effectiveness o f NGO intervention because a state may need long-term support to 
preserve the political transition. NGOs can also be competitive and counterproduc­
tive.100 In terms of journalism, there is no internationally accepted rule-book on 
training; a trainer affiliated with an NGO from one country may recommend one 
method based on the practices in his or her country, while another may contend that 
another method of reporting or story-telling is the better way. Granted, the practices 
of journalism in Western states are similar but emphases of Western states’ assis­
tance interventions may be different. For example, in Bosnia USAID tended to pro­
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while Canada and Western European states supported public sector media (more of a 
social responsibility model o f journalism).101
2.4 Promotion Strategy Literature
Although most Western nations commonly employ promotion strategies as a 
component of foreign aid, they can have wildly different approaches and sectoral 
emphases in their strategies. Studies show the European Union (EU) has tradition­
ally provided substantial assistance to processes of democratic transition, but less for 
democratic consolidation; more support for free and fair elections and civil and po­
litical rights than for promoting a transparent and accountable government. The ap­
proach in the United Kingdom is the reverse. UK aid is heavily invested in the pro­
motion o f open and accountable government. Sweden concentrates heavily on hu­
man rights. The United States has the widest coverage across all sectors o f democra­
tization, civil society, and good governance promotion strategies.102 As we will see 
in the next section, CIDA acknowledges that Canadian aid has been historically 
widely dispersed. Not surprisingly such an "indiscriminate" (as Crawford calls it) 
approach to promotion strategy aid is reflected in the media sector. Canada's media 
aid will be examined in length, below. For illustration here, I use Crawford's com­
parison o f the EU and Sweden showing that a higher proportion o f Swedish aid goes 
to pro-democracy groups than to media projects, and that whereas EU aid for pro­
democracy groups is relatively low, emphasis is put on the media sector.103 There is, 
apparently, no consensus in the West on which strategies work best and whether the
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media are an important or a lesser factor in the promotion of political development. 
Further exacerbating the incoherence of promotion strategies among donor states is 
participation with or membership in extra- or super-state organizations. Western na­
tions are therefore participating with each other in a web of interacting and overlap­
ping governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, each with distinctive per­
spectives on promoting political development. Add to this the NGO community and 
you have more layers of bureaucracy, more layers of mission statements, more layers 
of objectives, of accountability, o f budgeting, o f measuring effectiveness, etc. to add 
to the existing incoherence of distinctions between each nation's foreign policy ob­
jectives. Those distinct foreign policy objectives are well-known. The United 
States' uses of aid for clearly political purposes in Latin America, or the UK's politi­
cal aid in “reward” to Zambia and Uganda for accepting Structural Adjustments Pro­
grammes are but two examples of the political taint that lingers on promotion strate­
gies.104 Also, domestic politics can influence aid philosophies and application in the 
Western democracies. The granting of aid or the refusal to offer it to a particular de­
veloping state can become a political issue at home. How can a universal concept of 
plural, independent media be promoted when donor nations cannot even agree on 
what to promote and where?
Compounding this chaos, there are theoretical schools o f scholarship that reject 
the concept of promotion strategies entirely. A structuralist critic might see hegem­
ony creeping into developing states through strategies such as democratization, civil 
society and good governance promotion. Robinson calls promotion strategies a
104 Crawford, 52.
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"softer tool" than the coercion used by the United States in its effort to maintain 
power and privilege by co-opting dissatisfaction and unrest.105 At the other extreme, 
we might find libertarian critics who see no use whatsoever in engaging in promotion 
strategies. Criticism of promotion strategies can also be found in isolated country- 
specific analysis when they turn out to be failures. Rwanda, for instance, was a large 
recipient of democracy assistance from the United States prior to the genocide of 
1994. USAID had commenced a democratization program in October 1993, just 
months after the ill-fated Arusha peace accord was struck.106
2.5 Media Assistance Literature
Assuming that in an emerging democracy each component of political devel­
opment is affected by the progress of the other components of the transition, it fol­
lows that the emergence of a functioning media sector will not occur in isolation. 
Therefore media assistance interventions must take into consideration "the interrela­
tionship of the media industry's many parts and why the reform of the media sector 
necessitates a "web" of mutually reinforcing activities, the lack of any of which can 
endanger any others".107 Among the mutually reinforcing strands in this web are: 
the strength of civil society, the effectiveness of constitutional guarantees and the 
rule of law, the protection of journalists' safety, the selection, training and advance­
ment of individuals who are committed to the goals of a free and independent news 
media and the willingness of government to accept the legitimate place of the media 
in communicating information to citizens. On the receiving end of free and inde-
105 W.I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation US intervention- and hegemony. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 6.
106 Crawford, Promoting. 33.
107 Government of Canada. CIDA, The Role. 5.
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pendent media, the "audience" must possess the ability to critically analyze the in­
formation it is receiving. Thus, a successful intervention requires not only a sound 
political foundation but also a comprehension o f a receiving state's technological 
sophistication (since it would not be of much value to promote television journalism, 
say, in a state that has few televisions) and awareness of the citizenry's social context 
(for example, is literacy at a level sufficient for the viability o f effective print media? 
Are citizens educated to the extent that they can comprehend the function of inde­
pendent media so they are not susceptible to incitement by unscrupulous members of 
the media?). Since there is no “universal template of press and broadcasting freedom 
that can be stencilled mechanically onto different political-cultural configura­
tions,”108 the debate over which ‘rules o f the media game’ should transcend interna­
tional borders continues. This is nothing new. The conflict that emerged in the 
1970s over the concept of a global communication order nearly “crippled” 
UNESCO.109 What emerged as the on-going debate over an ambiguous New World 
Information and Communication Order (NWICO) at the United Nations is stuck in 
the same stalemate as many issues between the North and South are: what the role of 
the private sector should be in a transitional state, vis-a-vis that of the public sector. 
Indeed, the NWICO debate is so contentious it is held to be the catalyst for the with­
drawal o f the United States from UNESCO in 1985.110 In media assistance there is 
no consensus on whether the news media should compete in a free marketplace of 
ideas, should be state-sponsored (as in a public broadcaster), or should be a blended
i°8 Vicky Randall, Democratization and the Media. (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 4.
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system of both. Compounding the confusion over strategy, Price has identified two 
main strategic approaches to media assistance interventions.111 One is “top- down”: 
assistance is concentrated on creating - some might say imposing - alternative 
sources of information modeled on Western lines. The other approach is “bottom- 
up”: assistance is concentrated on strengthening local, indigenous media outlets with 
the intent of creating a public sphere, or civil society. Both approaches come in for 
criticism that they are often culturally inappropriate. Specifically, the “top-down” 
approach may alienate local journalists who view the imposed system and institu­
tions as foreign and even hostile to their interests. The “bottom-up” approach may 
lead to clashes with existing media that are partisan or non-professional.112
In terms of training journalists, assistance interventions are usually designed to 
develop the basic journalistic skill set: newsgathering, reporting, editing. Trainers 
attempt to 'train out1 factual and contextual errors, inadvertently or one-sided or in­
tentionally partisan reports and unreliably sourced information. Increasingly, jour­
nalistic training is focusing on the training of specific skills: investigative, financial, 
political, health, diversity, human rights, and conflict analysis.113 But a consistent 
criticism of media assistance interventions is that such aid has had a “quick fix” 
mentality; that is, media assistance is delivered in one-time projects that lack the 
need-specific planning and patience that might ensure successful outcomes.114 
Sending in a Western journalist for a two-week stint with a food-and-travel budget
111 Monroe Price, Re-structuring the Media in Post-Conflict Societies: Four Perspectives, the Experience of Inter­
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and a whiteboard to ‘teach’ journalism in a developing world state - which is a com­
mon form of media assistance intervention - is not likely to yield much success if the 
recipient state is not advanced in other aspects of political development.
2.6 Indigenous theories o f media development
Inherent in media assistance interventions is an assumption that the Western 
methods, standards and ethics are best when it comes to promotion strategies. That 
is, Western models of political development with only slight variations (such as dif­
fering structures of government, e.g. parliamentary versus presidential systems) are 
universally applicable if based on the fundamentals of democracy, good governance 
and civil society. Regarding the media, it is clear that media assistance strategies 
likewise mimic Western journalism: trainers train western journalistic techniques and 
values. This may not be the only way. There are two leading alternatives to the 
transfer o f Western news media principles and practices to the developing world. 
They are: first, a blending or a fusion of Western journalism with the political culture 
of the developing world and, second, the emerging of an authentic indigenous jour­
nalism. Each of these alternatives is related to the concepts o f development (or de­
velopmental) journalism and utilitarian journalism, especially when applying analy­
sis to Africa. As colonies began to gain their independence, the Western news media 
practices put in place by the colonizers were supplanted by nationalist media. Post­
colonial African leaders, often former print journalists or publishers, understood very 
well the power of the media and how it could be used against them. Consequently, 
the justification for imposing restrictions was found under the loose definition of de­
velopment journalism, a term describing a concept that emerged, inter alia,
38
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in the Philippines in the 1960s.115 Golding lists four components of development 
journalism: 1. news has an educational function; 2. focus on news stories that display 
social needs; 3. prominence is given to news about self-help projects and, 4. journal­
ists should tackle specific problems such as governmental corruption with "prudent 
obliqueness".116 There are multiple variations on the development journalism model. 
Depending on the political circumstances of the individual state and the inclination 
o f the leadership, we might add to Golding's list the far more restrictive and politi­
cally-oriented criteria o f mobilizing the masses in support o f the government, not 
practicing investigative journalism and not criticizing the government. Always un­
der the rubric of development journalism one finds the premise that freedom of the 
press comes only as long as that freedom is used with responsibility. The euphemis­
tic use of the word "responsibility" in place of self-censorship is apparent in Harbor's 
assessment that the common theme running through development journalism is "the 
lack of a watchdog function of the media."117 In other words, there is a fine line be­
tween supporting development as a journalist and supporting the policies of the state 
as a journalist. Rather, Harbor prefers the term utilitarian journalism. He describes 
utilitarian journalism as "useful journalism or journalism that can and will serve the 
genuine (his italics) needs of Africa and Africans".118 His list o f components of utili­
tarian journalism overlaps development journalism somewhat, but the consistent 
thread in utilitarian journalism is that news media serve the needs of the community 
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governments and tends to be disregarded in development journalism, utilitarian jour­
nalism embraces investigative reporting because it may uncover corruption which 
benefits the community, though perhaps not the regime. The utilitarian media should 
also be free to criticize the government but must be cautious of trivializing democ­
ratically elected officials. The responsibility of journalists here, theoretically, is to 
exercise caution criticizing a democratic government at the risk of seeing it toppled 
and the country returned to authoritarianism. The success of utilitarian journalism 
lies then in identifying what a genuine need is, and who should determine it, the gov­
ernment or the media? Harbor comes down on the side of the media determining 
what a genuine need is, because the media can be checked by various means (i.e. 
through competition) while a dictator is responsible to no one. Scholars in this area 
note the complex relationships between the leaders and the led, the economic chal­
lenges to be overcome, and the historical instability, inherent in democratic transi­
tions. But the news media can stabilize transitions by deterring instability argues 
Harbor, who contends that utilitarian journalism is far superior to development jour­
nalism in doing this.
The theories of development journalism and, to a lesser extent, utilitarian journal­
ism thus relegate many of the rights-based principles of universal concepts of jour­
nalism to secondary status. What is o f primary concern to utilitarian and develop­
mental journalists is the consequence of news reporting within the community. It is 
a community in development, after all. The free-wheeling independence of Western- 
style journalism may be counter-cultural. Governments may tighten control o f the 
media under developmental journalism as necessary to consolidate national
40
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aspirations. Since utilitarian journalism is needs-based, in the hierarchy of develop­
ing world "needs" freedoms of speech and the rights of the media may not rank as 
high as others. The civil society of a transitional state may not support the status of 
the journalist as in the West: "[Cjivil society must be independent from the state but 
not alienated from it. It must be watchful but respectful of state authority; it must 
manifest balance between the subject and participant observations".119 This is a sub­
ject broached by Neumayer. He suggests that civil/political rights (such as the right 
to an independent media) may not have the same status as personal integrity rights -  
freedom from imprisonment, torture and murder. Political/civil rights violations do 
not carry the same status, he notes. "One cannot dismiss the argument that these 
rights are contingent on a particular form of Western culture and that a certain 
amount of political/civil rights violations are somehow "necessary" for the stability 
of certain countries and the welfare of their people as easily as one can dismiss a 
similar argument with respect to political imprisonment, torture and murder".120
Indeed, media assistance recipient states may very well view civil society and the 
role of journalists much differently than we do. The incompatibility o f the political 
culture of the developing world with the Western concept of journalism and its guar­
antees of freedom and independence established over centuries, crusader identity, 
and adversarial tendencies, is a contentious point of theoretical debate. Golding 
writes o f how the impartial, objective, analytical and non-partisan view of politics 
espoused in principle by Western journalists is not likely to prevail in the developing
1,9 Diamond, 252.
120 Eric Neumayer, “Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocations?” Social Science Quarterly 84: 3 (2003):
650 -  652.
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world because, "the market and work situations compromise any possible institu­
tional neutrality, so that modem and traditional communications remain 'wedded to 
social and political processes"’.121 Here he is saying that the social and political cul­
ture of the state may make it impossible for Western news media principles to be ap­
plied. Individually, the developing world journalist may not be able to fully embrace 
Western journalistic principles either because of convictions that pre interprets his or 
her reporting. The journalist cannot detach. Gurevitch makes the point that despite 
the principle of ostensible detachment in the practice of Western journalism, all jour­
nalists "are active participants of the world they report on rather than observers of 
that world".122 Objectivity may be impossible. However, the Western concept of 
journalism strives for objectivity, in principle — even if it is likewise impossible to 
achieve in the West. The manifestation of this is seen in the principles o f "balanced" 
and "fair" coverage wherein both sides of an issue are ostensibly covered within the 
confines of a story, within the editorial opinions espoused in the pages o f a newspa­
per or in the broadcast media, or in the balance that should occur when there is com­
petition between independent media outlets for the minds of news consumers. To be 
realistic, what occurs in the West is at best a semblance of balance. Moreover, what 
Whitehead calls the "impersonal irresponsibility" of modem commercialized mass 
media, could also lead to “majoritarian incivility”.123
In the West news consumers must check the media against their personal values. 
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type of journalism that reflects their values, ethics, and cultures. Developing world 
news consumers may have less ability to check the veracity of the news media be­
cause of illiteracy and poor education, or because of state intervention in the com­
petitive balance. Harsher critics find more flaws in the transfer of Western news 
media practices and principles than simply a Western square peg not fitting into the 
round hole of the developing world. More than just a bad development fit, they ar­
gue that the promotion of media principles is breeding a dependence of a kind that 
harkens back to the criticism of 50s and 60s developmental theory.124 This critique 
implies that the transfer of Western news media principles and practices is not 
merely unfeasible and possibly detrimental to political development, but that the 
news media are a tacit device of Western hegemonic expansion.
2.7 The mvth of plural media
Media assistance interventions may also transfer standard practices of the Western news 
media, which may in feet inhibit political development as well. Newspapers and news­
casts have deadlines: a press run is at a certain hour, as are television newscasts; deadlines 
limit the time a reporter has to gather plural voices; news stories have lengths and must fit 
into the overall timing of the newscast. Again, these are limitations -  limitations to the 
gathering of multiple opinions and contributions in the West and in the developing world. 
These practices, which enforce standardized story-telling, have been transferred to the de­
veloping world.125 Newscasts and newspapers are structured the same way in the develop­
ing world as in the West. Stories in the developing world are now often told the same way
124 Golding, 292
125 Personal observations of the author, and evidence found in observing such developing world broadcasters as A1 
Jazeera, confirms that the format of broadcast media has been transferred.
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they are in the West, generalized with a tendency to balance issues into black and white 
comparisons. More than the limitations imposed by stylistic confines of the Western media 
model though, achieving plurality takes time and is unlikely to be attained through promo­
tion strategies alone. However, even when plural media exist, individual choices and deci­
sion-making may limit the extent to which alternative opinions and points of view are as­
similated individually. Individuals may seek opinions that conform to their ethnic group’s 
opinion or to their community’s opinion, while individuals belonging to other sects or 
faiths within the very same state may seek diametrically opposed opinions that bolster their 
own; examples here include Lebanon and Bosnia. Models such as Whitehead's metaphor 
of political transition as a kind of theatre, assume a degree of homogeneity among the audi­
ence (populace), which may not be the case. Whitehead himself acknowledges that polities 
are usually "heterogeneous, dispersed, easily distracted and attend only selectively to parts 
of the ongoing political narratives."126 Media theorists conceive of a "public space" — the 
space where those affected by general social norms and collective political decisions can 
have a say in the formulation, adoption and stipulation of procedures.127 But this commu­
nication may run up against background convictions in states that consist of multiple cul­
tures: "Participants find the relations between the objective, social, and subjective worlds 
already pre-interpreted"128 because "communicative actors are always moving within the 
horizon of their lifeworld; they cannot step outside of it".129 Also, there is simply a limit to 
how many media an individual can consume. How many newspapers, websites, and radio
126 Whitehead, 61.
127 Sevla Benhabib, in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), 87.
128 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 125.
129 Habermas, 126.
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and television programs could one read, watch or listen to on a given day, even if one had 
the financial resources to access a wide cross-section of opinions? Plurality is conse­
quently difficult to attain. There can also be detrimental consequences to the pursuit of 
wide-open plural media. In a developing world media marketplace such as the Philippines 
the competition for listeners is so intense in the radio medium that the standards of journal­
ism sometimes fell to the way-side; inflammatory and unfounded allegations are often 
broadcast in order to attract audience.130 Again, theory does not always match reality: al­
though plurality is possible, it may not be attainable or even desirable. Additionally, due to 
low rates of literacy and education, even where genuine plurality exists news consumers 
may not possess the same capacities to discern a point of view in the media as their coun­
terparts in the West can. Furthermore, I suggest a counter-intuitive criticism of the media 
that has received little analysis, namely, that confusion can ensue from plurality. Modeled 
as they are after Western media, public and private news organizations in the developing 
world often run, hour after hour, day after day, analysis and interviews which leads to a fa­
tigue within the public and a situation where the audience tunes out rather than tuning in to
131issues.
Such is the theoretical environment in which Canada attempts to assist media 
development. Since recipient states are diverse, democratization, good governance 
and civil society promotion strategies are not universally applicable templates. The 
media as a tool to enhance human rights and build peace are questionable. The role 
of NGOs in media assistance, while pivotal, is open to debate. Finally, the very 
model o f Westem-style media is potentially harmful, given the unique characteristics
130 See example: Philippines for elaboration, below
131 Observations of the author in the Philippines, Summer 2005, during the crisis over President Arroyo’s tampering 
with the 2004 election.
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of Westem-style media is potentially harmful, given the unique characteristics of the 
developing world, with plurality perhaps unattainable. Building on this, the next 
chapter explores in detail Canada’s objectives and the outcomes of media ODA.
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Chapter 3: Canada and Media Assistance
Canada's foreign policy is firmly rooted in liberal internationalist and liberal insti­
tutionalist traditions. Many Canadians continue to identify with individuals such as 
Lester Pearson, tasks such as peacekeeping, and the role of playing the helpful fixer 
of agreements, such as the Ottawa Protocol on land mines. In justifying foreign aid, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) frames interna­
tional assistance not as noblesse oblige, but rather that ODA helps to ensure Canadi­
ans' wealth, prosperity and security.132 In doing this Canada strongly supports inter­
national institutions such as the United Nations and its agencies, engages in liberal 
international trade regimes such as the WTO and NAFTA, and shares principles of 
other Western states as espoused in the UN Millenium Declaration and in Organiza­
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) documents.133134 Today 
the Canadian government subscribes to the principle that access to plural independ­
ent media is a universal human right. In practical terms, plural independent media 
are also held by the Canadian government to be a building block of political devel­
opment. An examination of CIDA's relevant documents shows, however, that media 
assistance, while apparently a highly regarded component o f ODA, is most often ap­
pended to other strategies and goals, as opposed to standing alone strategically.
132 See Department of Foreign Affairs website available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/menu- 
en.asp
133 Government of Canada. CIDA Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening 
Aid Effectiveness. Hull (2002): 1
134 Government of Canada. CIDA, Making, 4
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3.1 Canadian Foreign Aid
Since media assistance is a subset of Canada's overall ODA strategy, the exami­
nation of Canadian media assistance interventions begins with a review of Ottawa's 
overarching rationale in providing foreign aid. The literature on Canada's modern 
ODA strategy is extensive and dates back more than fifty years. Assuming that the 
present manifestation of foreign assistance strategy is built upon the designs of and 
lessons gleaned from previous strategies, it is instructive therefore to first review 
briefly the history of Canada's foreign assistance.
The concept of post-World War II foreign assistance that emerged following the 
Commonwealth countries' January 1950 Colombo Conference was clearly designed 
to be in large part a bulwark against the spread of communism.135 Prime Minister St. 
Laurent confirmed as much in a March 1950 speech promoting the use of foreign aid 
as an "intangible way" to help win the Cold War.136 In a seminal review of Canada's 
post-Colombo foreign policy "A Samaritan state? External aid in Canada's foreign 
policy" Spicer confirms the primacy of the anti-communist motivation for aid in the 
1950s, especially aid for Southeast Asia. The strategy behind the "anti-communist 
aid thesis" was threefold, Spicer suggests: first, aid promotes liberal democracy; sec­
ond, aid gives donors significant control over a recipient's foreign policy by attach­
ing conditions to aid; and third, aid creates goodwill.137 Yet, in assessing the fifteen 
years of anti-communist aid strategy Spicer concluded there was "no proven relation
135 Canada's delegation to Colombo in 1950 included, among others, Lester B. Pearson and Escott Reid, who were 
to become influential foreign policy decision makers through the 1950s and 1960s.
136 St. Laurent speech available from http://www.collectiQnscanada.ca/primeministers/h4-4015-e.html.
137 Keith Spicer, A  Samaritan state? External aid in Canada's foreign policy. ^Toronto: University o f  T oron to  Press,
1966), 24.
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between external aid and the flowering of liberal democracy".138 Nonetheless, the 
design of Canada's ODA strategy carried the imprimatur of the 1950s into at least the 
late 1960s. Regarding specific project emphases, the 1950s and 1960s were a period 
of large infrastructure investments as opposed to the kinds of interventions we see 
today. But in the 1960s focus changed incrementally. The large infrastructure in­
vestment gradually declined in importance while education, for example, became 
more of a priority. The creation o f CIDA in 1968 formed the new organization 
through which the changing goals o f ODA were to be realized. A shift "reflecting a 
new concern to reach and help the poorest" in the 1970s139 coincided with increasing 
attention paid by Canada's assistance strategists to a "panoply of civil, political, eco­
nomic, social, and cultural rights" stemming from Ottawa's commitment to interna­
tional covenants such as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.140 There 
was a relationship between poverty reduction and civil and political rights, it was ar­
gued, because a population denied these rights, especially the poor, cannot freely 
participate in the economic decisions that affect them.141 Of pertinence to this study, 
the mid-1980s were an important period of change in Canada's ODA design. The 
trend away from geo-strategic selection was reinforced in the 1988 "Sharing Our Fu­
ture" strategy document, the first review in nearly two decades. Foreign aid acquired 
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it had been an adjunct instrument of international politics and trade.142 Emphasis 
shifted to sectors aiding human resources development and economic and financial 
assistance as infrastructure projects declined in importance.143 These are sectors ide­
ally suited to the format of media assistance interventions applied today. Sector shift 
was mirrored by a shift in tactical emphasis to knowledge transfers, skills upgrading 
or strengthening institutions through, among other methods, training.144 Furthermore, 
1987 is seen to be an important transitional year, with human rights assuming a 
greater role within aid policy.145 As well, greater emphasis was put on "country fo­
cus" in an attempt to permit flexibility in choosing appropriate channels for aid de­
livery.146
Upon review, it can be seen that these historic changes and developments in ODA 
design come together in Canada’s media assistance strategies today: media assistance 
is designed to aid in the promotion of liberal democracy (one of the earliest and most 
consistent goals of Canadian ODA); media assistance is not a ‘large infrastructure 
investment’; media assistance is based on universal concepts o f human and political 
rights development; media assistance is a human resources development strategy; 
media assistance is a knowledge transfer; media assistance strategies do concentrate 
on training; and, lastly, as we will see below, media assistance strategies are ‘coun­
try-focused’.
142Martin Rudner, “Canada's Official Development Assistance Strategy: Process, goals and priorities” Canadian 
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Where are we now? Despite failing to achieve the desired .7 percent of GDP, 
Canada is still a major donor of foreign assistance in real dollar terms. As of 2003, 
Canada ranks 10th among the 22 members of the OECD's DAC at $2.03 billion (USD) 
in net ODA spending. Canada’s ODA budget is roughly .24 percent of GNI.147 As 
for the motivation behind Canada's foreign aid, Canada is less politically motivated 
than the United States and the United Kingdom. As a political tool, ODA has been 
used by Canada over the years as a reward for political development. Alternatively, 
the withdrawal of aid has served to influence political outcomes, but the record in 
this area is "halting, inconsistent and ambiguous".148 An example of this in a media 
context was the termination by Canada of a line of credit extended to Guyana to buy 
Canadian newsprint because the opposition press was not granted access to paper.149 
Even this example is specious, however. Although the provision of a line of credit 
for newsprint can be defined as media assistance, its impact on political development 
is dubious. After all, newsprint can be acquired elsewhere and it can still be denied 
to the opposition press, especially if the opposition press has limited financial re­
sources. The withdrawal of media assistance is therefore not a very useful punitive 
tool. Utilizing media assistance as a reward to a pro-reform government is only 
marginally more useful, given that such aid rarely goes directly to the government.
As we shall see below, most media assistance is aimed at indigenous NGOs which 
benefit the government little. Indeed, even reform-minded governments may care 
little if indigenous media NGOs get assistance from Canada.
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As for expectations vis-a-vis outcomes, Neumayer places Canada in a group of 
"like-minded countries", along with Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, 
who are commonly regarded as committed to human rights in their ODA distribution. 
He shows, however, that the "like-minded countries do not fare better as a group than 
the other donors in spite of usually being portrayed (not the least by themselves) as 
committed to the pursuit of human rights."150 Doubt is often cast, however, on the 
assumption that aid is an altruistic tool of foreign policy of the middle power states, 
"most notably Canada and the Nordic countries".151
In summary, the changes and permutations in Canada's foreign aid strategy over the past 
fifty years underlie several of the contentious issues surrounding media assistance today. 
Over time Ottawa's retreat from project development and delivery of aid has put increasing 
decision-making power into the hands of NGOs. Media and journalistic NGOs have con­
sequently risen to the fore and remain a potent force in media assistance ODA. The broad­
ening of the recipient base has opened the door to interventions across a diverse set of 
countries, similar in some ways, but potentially quite different in conditions of develop­
ment. The shift in emphasis from large infrastructure projects in a few select countries, to 
social and political development along with the promotion of human rights across a wide 
spectrum of countries and conditions is strategically nebulous. It comes as no surprise, 
then, that the subset of media assistance reflects in microcosm the criticism leveled at other 
aspects of Canadian foreign aid strategy: unfocussed and too widely dispersed.
150 Neumayer,, 663.
151Peter J. Schrader, Steven W. Hook and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of 
American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50 (1998): 320.
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3.2 CIDA
The creation of CIDA marked a watershed in Canadian foreign assistance. CIDA's in­
ception distinguished foreign assistance from other aspects of foreign policy by giving 
ODA status and identity within its own dedicated agency. However, even today CIDA and 
its parent, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), often over­
lap each other's mandate in the area of media assistance.152 But in the main, because CIDA 
is the funding organ of Canadian ODA, it is the focus of this study rather than DFAIT.
Corresponding to the spirit of the times, early documents confirm that ODA de­
livered through CIDA was still more heavily concentrated in areas of infrastructure 
development and relief o f immediate crises such as famine than in areas such as the 
development o f democracy, civil society and good governance. Projects such as wa­
ter delivery, sanitation, aid for energy generation are prominently listed in CIDA’s 
early reports. Within a few years CIDA is clearly changing tack. While infrastruc­
ture development and crisis intervention were still important for CIDA in the early 
1970s, the development of "human resources" gained increasing importance, such as 
the concept o f media assistance. For example, more than sixty Senegalese students 
were trained in journalism in 1976 by CIDA; in 1977, 150 scholarships in journalism 
in Niger were funded by CIDA.153 Over the next twenty years CIDA's focus changed 
in response to political directives and funding contingencies. At the end of the Cold 
War, CIDA was funding far less the types of infrastructure and economic projects 
that defined the agency's early years and concentrating more on aspects of human
152 For example, DFAIT has sponsored media training in Kenya.
153 CIDA 1976 Annual Aid Review, Information Division of the Communications Branch, CIDA, Ottawa, Novem­
ber 1977,21.
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and social development. This is the paradigm that prevails today in CIDA, as illus­
trated by an emphasis on civil society promotion. For example, the 1996 "Policy for 
CIDA on Human Rights, Democratization, and Good Governance" lauds the princi­
ple of promoting civil society: "The government's approach to rights, democracy and 
governance, expressed in these CIDA objectives... emphasizes organizations in civil 
society as key vehicles for articulation popular concerns and channelling popular 
participation in decision and policy making".154 This is confirmed in a 2002 policy 
statement on strengthening aid effectiveness.155 CIDA, as Canada's main agent of 
ODA project selection and delivery, follows DFAIT's lead in spreading aid widely.
At present, CIDA supports hundreds o f organizations, projects and linkages with in­
ternational institutions. The trend, however, is to focus aid strategy more clearly.
The 2002 policy statement "Canada Making a Difference in the World" reinforces 
the principles o f good governance, building capacity and civil society, which 
emerged as consistent themes in Canadian aid policy through the 1990s, as did the 
promotion of democratization. In acknowledging that Canada has consistently been 
one of the least concentrated of Western donor countries in terms of dispersing aid, 
the policy takes steps to narrow CIDA's focus. This can be seen three ways:
• Refining the principles o f effective development. The refined principles in­
clude local ownership, whereby recipient countries must develop their own 
development strategies if they are to be sustainable, improved donor coordi-
154 Canada. CIDA. Policy. 3.
155 Canada. CIDA. Making.
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nation and coherence, and a results-based approach, with improved monitor­
ing and evaluation of development programs.156
• Emphasize "programmatic" forms of support versus "project" forms of sup­
port. Program-based approaches "give more emphasis to comprehensive and 
coordinated planning" in sectoral or thematic programs, particularly in areas 
o f poverty reduction, per the Millennium Declaration.157 Working through 
NGOs with the governments o f recipient states on Sector-Wide Approaches 
(SWAps) CIDA's intent is to better coordinate strategic approaches. A pre­
mium is placed "on local ownership and donor coordination" that embodies a 
comprehensive approach to development.158 These are program-based initia­
tives. Projects, on the other hand, CIDA concedes "were often implemented 
with insufficient regard for the broader context which could affect, or under­
mine, their impact".159 Furthermore, project delivery o f aid can lead to a 
piecemeal and uncoordinated approach to development. In other words, 
CIDA was admitting that perhaps too many projects (and NGOs) had been 
supported in the past and aid too widely scattered.
• The third method of narrowing focus is to specifically target countries or re­
gions for aid. Aid to nine target countries has been increased, at least tempo­
rarily. The nine countries are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Hondu­
156 Canada. CIDA. Making 4.
157 Canada. CIDA. Making. 6.
158 Canada. CIDA. Making 7.
159 Canada. CIDA. Making 6.
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ras, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal and Tanzania.160 The past Minister of Inter­
national Cooperation, the ministry responsible for CIDA, confirmed in the 
spring of 2004 that this nine country focus was still viable and was being pur­
sued as development policy by CIDA.161 Beyond the nine-country focus, 
CIDA is also targeting the continent o f Africa for specific aid.
"Canada Making a Difference in the World" clearly connects progress in political 
development as a long-term determinant of which countries will continue to receive 
Canadian ODA. Noting the uneven process o f democratic transition in Africa, praise 
is reserved for democratically-elected leaders in countries such as Senegal, Uganda, 
Tanzania and Botswana, who have "signalled clearly their commitment to positive 
change and are taking action in this respect".162 Poor countries that demonstrate "ef­
forts to improve governance... end corruption and make effective use of aid monies" 
will be selected for "enhanced partnerships" and receive a greater share o f incre­
mental funds.163
Regarding specific news media development programming, "Canada Making a 
Difference in the World" is silent. It addresses urgent social issues by setting out 
four priority sectors: health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, basic education, and child pro­
tection. Gender equality is to be an integral part of all four priority areas.164 The 
fact that news media development is not specifically mentioned in "Canada Making a
160 Government of Canada. CIDA. New Canadian Investments in Nine Developing Countries (news release) 20 
December 2002
161 Susan Whelan, past Minister of International Cooperation in response to a question from author on at the Uni­
versity of Windsor. October, 2003.
162 Canada,. CIDA. Making, 24.
163 Canada. CIDA., Making 12.
164 Canada. CIDA. Making 13.
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Difference in the World" does not mean that media assistance is no longer one of 
CIDA's strategies. In the absence of a White Paper on Canadian ODA, we can as­
sume that previous strategies are valid unless they have been repudiated. Tracing 
back CIDA documents reveals that media assistance has long been part o f Canada's 
strategy of promoting good governance, civil society and democratization in the de­
veloping world. For example:
• Building "the role o f and independent, responsible media through training, 
technical assistance and linkages between journalists" was listed in 1996 as 
one of the types of intervention that CIDA views as supporting human rights, 
democratization and good governance objectives.165
• According to CIDA, a strong democratic society will be characterized by "an 
active independent media" among other factors such as tolerance of dissent 
and an independent judiciary.166
• The media is one of the organizations in civil society with whom CIDA will 
work "to achieve the objectives o f the Government policy".167168
Lloyd Axworthy, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, singled out "free and vocal me­
dia" in 1997 as part o f the infrastructure o f "Peacebuilding" along with a civilian po­
lice force, and an impartial judiciary.169 The development of free and independent
165 Canada. CIDA. Rights. 7.
164 Canada. CIDA. Rights. 14.
167 Canada. CIDA. Rights. 9.
168 Canada. CIDA. Malting 1.
149 Lloyd Axworthy, “Canada and human security: the need for leadership” International J oumal. (Spring 1997): 187
57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
media was and remains an integral component of Canadian foreign policy objectives 
as part of both political and social development.170 Clearly, CIDA asserts the media 
can help to hold a government accountable, aid in transparency, educate and inform, 
advance democratization and build peace. The many-faceted functions, roles and 
expectations o f media assistance interventions are reflected in CIDA's funding 
documents. There is no single category under which media assistance is broken out. 
Rather, media assistance is distributed across several categories, sectors and pro­
grams. For instance, CIDA funding through Canadian Journalists for Free Expres­
sion (CJFE) for the installation of a printing press in Sierra Leone in 2001 is distrib­
uted through the CIDA Peacebuilding Fund.171 More specifically, the $288,000 
committed for this project's priority allocation is "civil society's policy role" (Code 
0404). The sector allocation is "free flow o f information" (Code 15065).172 But pre­
vious funding o f $96,621 in 1995 through CJFE to a project titled, "Promoting De­
mocracy in Cambodia through media development" has no designated priority alloca­
tion at all, while the project's sector allocation is "education policy and administra­
tive management" (code 011110).173 In 2002, CIDA committed $100,000 for a jour­
nalism training initiative in Thailand. Like the Sierra Leone project, the sector allo­
cation is "free flow of information". Yet, $20,000 of this funding is also allocated to 
the "strengthening civil society" sector (code 015050) and the project's priority allo­
cation is similarly split between "gender equality" (code 0202) and "democratic insti­
170Evidence of this is seen as recently as February 2005 when DFAIT sponsored a regional workshop on investiga­
tive journalism in Kenya.http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nairobi/news-2005-03-07-en.asp
171 CIDA Update September 2001 Issue 2
172 CIDA Reporting: Project M010408 -  Peace and Democracy through Media 5
173 CIDA Reporting: Project S049509 - Promoting Democracy in Cambodia through media develop­
ment/ promoting democracy in Cambodia through media development 13
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tutions and practices" (code 0402).174 In these examples, although the priorities and 
sectors noted are closely related and not necessarily contradictory, the allocation of 
funds for similar projects across different priorities and sectors hinders the task of 
sorting out what is spent where, on what. Accordingly, it is difficult to measure ef­
fectiveness when projects that appear strikingly similar are listed under different sec­
tor and priority envelopes. This is compounded further by the fact that single pro­
jects, such as the 2002 Thailand intervention, target multiple priorities and sectors, 
with funding split accordingly.
But in moving from the theoretical to the practical in terms of good governance, 
we see evidence that aid may never be spent where it is intended. Goldfarb contends 
that Canada "gives more of its bilateral development aid to countries perceived to be 
highly corrupt than to those that are less corrupt."175 But it should be recalled here 
that the advancement of democratization, the development of civil society and good 
governance is a long-term process. Aid may consequently end up in states with 
worse corruption problems than states further along in their political development.
3.3 The media NGOs
CIDA's preferred method o f distributing ODA for media projects is through 
NGOs.176
The shift to project-based and sector emphasis in the 1980s led to an increase in the 
funding for NGOs and the role they play in the delivery of aid. As well, NGOs 
brought issues such as gender and human rights to the attention of CIDA during this
174 CIDA Reporting: Project S062017: Building Democracy/Journalism in Thailand 19
175 Goldfarb, 2.
176 Use of NGOs is a common method of distributing ODA in all Western states, ie. Sweden. Source: Crawford, 52
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period and began to drive project selection through the "free trade" in ideas between 
bureaucrats and the NGOs. NGOs were also utilized as the public face of Canada's 
ODA.177 This trend to delivery of aid through NGOs was further entrenched under 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney as a response to limited resources available for for­
eign aid projects through the 1980s and 1990s. It also delegated more operational 
control to NGOs in order to decentralize program responsibility, the government 
thereby getting out o f the business o f running programmes in order to play a more 
strategic role. Even as CIDA contemplates putting more o f its own staff boots on the 
ground in the developing world again, since NGOs remain the delivery agents o f aid 
and providers of content and project staff, it does not seem likely that the role o f 
NGOs will diminish. The 2002 "Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy 
Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness" recognizes "the important role o f 
non-state actors as deliverers of development assistance (and) advocates of social 
and political change within the developing world".178 In terms of media assistance 
the following table lists some of the organizations that have received funding from 
CIDA to work in the area of media assistance since 1990:
Table 1. NGOs distributing CIDA media assistance ODA
Alliances des Radio Communautaires du Canada 
Alternatives Inc.
Association Mondiale des Radiodiffusseurs Communautaire 
Canadian Executive Service Organization 
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE)
Carleton University
Centre International de Solidarite Ouvriere 
Commonwealth Association of Journalists
777 Pratt, 95
178 Canada. CIDA. Making.
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Co-Development Canada 
CUSO
Developing Countries Farm Radio Network (DCFRN)
Foundation for International Training Third World Countries 
Infact Canada
Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society 
Inter-Press Services 
Oblat Missionaries
Organization Catholique Canadienne pour le Developpement et la Paix 
Oxfam
Reseau Liberte 
Solidarite Union Cooperation 
Transparency International 
United Church o f Canada 
University o f Western Ontario 
Vues D'Afrique
World Bank (partial list)179 ______________  _________________
As the above list indicates, a diverse array o f NGOs are funded under the rubric 
of media assistance. Religious organizations and universities are mingled with jour­
nalistic NGOs. Canadian NGOs working in media assistance also overlap with each 
other and aid each other's work. For example, DCFRN staff members have served on 
the board of CJFE. CUSO has recently begun working with DCFRN. The media 
NGO community's relationship with CIDA is also symbiotic: sometimes CIDA ap­
proaches an NGO seeking its participation in a project; other times, the NGO ap­
proaches CIDA with a project proposal.180
3.4 Analysis of Canadian Media Assistance Interventions
This study is overwhelmingly a qualitative analysis. The justification for this is 
threefold. First, the purpose of this study is to examine the overall purpose, design 
and success o f Canada’s media assistance strategy within the confines o f a Master’s
179 Canada. House of Commons Library.
180 Arnold Amber, President, Canadian Joumalists for Free Expression, conversation with author, 27 July, 2004.
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level dissertation; the breadth and scope of data collection required for a comprehen­
sive quantitative analysis is simply not possible here, given the disparities among 
developing world states that receive media assistance ODA from Canada and other 
Western states.181 Second, using conventional methodology for evaluating assistance 
for political development seeks "a technical solution to a political problem".182 For 
example, even though the Saudis have a high number of communication devices per 
capita, their polity can hardly be considered free.183 Statistics are therefore not al­
ways a useful indicator of political development, given that the penetration of media 
can be wildly unequal.184 Third, in focusing only on data, a subtle turning point may 
be missed because the evidence of a turning point may simply not be quantifiable.
As the Danish government discovered in a study of its ODA from 1990-1998, even 
with quantifiable data the causal linkages are found to be tenuous at best.185 Indeed, 
recognizing the weaknesses o f quantitative assessment at the national level, USAID 
in 2001 reversed the course o f its 1998 Handbook o f Democracy and Governance 
Program Indicators, which emphasized quantitative analysis, to concentrate on quali­
tative indicators on country or sectoral case study bases.186 CIDA has traditionally 
employed a logical framework approach (LFA) to evaluation (a logical sequence is 
traced from activities to outputs/outcomes) called results-based management (RBM),
181A quantitative analysis may be an intriguing avenue for future research. Developing and testing an index of vari­
ables that affect the outcomes of media assistance interventions could be useful for policy makers deciding where 
and when to intervene.
182 Crawford, Gordon. "Promoting Democracy from Without -  Learning from Within (Part II)", Democratization 
(10), 2.
183 Transparency International rates Saudi Arabia as a "not free" state with low levels of political and civiil rights.
184 Srebemy-Mohammadi, 195.
185 Specifically Guatemala; Crawford, Part 1.90.
186 Crawford, Part II. 81.
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similar to USAID's 'managing for results' (MFR) in using a performance framework 
(PF) and a performance measurement framework (PMF). A PF anticipates cause- 
and-effect relationships from the level o f activities upward to the strategic goals, 
while the PMF is a systematic plan for measurement and verification through per­
formance indicators and data collection.187 The limitations to this approach, with its 
emphasis on quantitative measurement are not lost on CIDA. "Blueprint-type pro­
jects" have been recognized as fitting poorly in complex developing world states; 
causality in governance programming can be rejected because "there are too many 
variables at play".188 Crawford rejects logical framework analysis too: "The 
(pseudo)-scientific approach is unable to cope with the dynamic political context in 
which DG (democracy and governance) activities are embedded... evaluating democ­
racy and governance assistance is more art than science."189 CIDA's most recent 
commentary on the monitoring of its aid effectiveness is contained in the Measuring 
Results section within "Canada Making a Difference in the World". It is stated that, 
regarding the eight Millennium Development goals,190 Canada will rely on United 
Nations statistics and assessments to monitor progress. In other aspects o f aid fund­
ing, "Canada Making a Difference in the World" notes that measuring effectiveness 
must reflect the transition that is occurring in aid policy from project emphasis to 
programme/country level emphasis.
187 Crawford, Part 1.79.
188 Crawford, Part 1.82.
189 Crawford, Part I. 86.
190 The eight Millenium Declaration goals are: 1. eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2. achieve universal primary 
education, 3. promote gender equality and empower women, 4. reduce child poverty, 5. improve maternal health,
6. combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7. ensure environmental sustainability, and 8. develop a global 
partnership for development Source=http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
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But if we cannot analyze the process o f political development through empirical 
data and test our conclusions, can these conclusions be considered valid? Is qualita­
tive study so fraught with subjectivity that such an analysis is itself invalid? A 1996 
report for CIDA acknowledges the dilemma: "the principally qualitative nature of 
political change has tended to make analysts shy away from attempts to measure or 
quantify (political development)".191 Yet while qualitative comparisons may yield 
ambiguous data the advantage qualitative comparisons possess is flexibility in as­
sessing the varied outcomes and the unequal nature of transitions. Besides, insisting 
on standardized outcomes regardless o f context o f resources is both historically and 
culturally insensitive.192 Ideally, quantitative and qualitative measurements o f hu­
man rights and democratic development are then "used in tandem".193 However, a 
strictly qualitative analysis is open to criticism of selectivity bias.
3.3.1 Collection o f Data
There are four sources of data used in this study. The first set o f data was gath­
ered at the Parliamentary Library o f the House of Commons through a subject search 
of media ODA projects. This search yielded extensive data. After sorting these 
documents, specific representative country and NGO data were selected for analysis. 
A second set o f data was gathered through the information branch o f CIDA: a refined 
search based on the representative country and NGO date acquired from the Parlia­
mentary Library was personally submitted to the information branch o f CIDA in Hull,
191 Dan Kapoor, Indicators for Programming in Human Rights and Democratic Development: A Preliminary Study 
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Quebec, which yielded a second collection of documents. Cross-referencing the data 
from the two searches confirmed ODA spending through NGOs selected for analysis. 
A third set o f data was acquired through elite interviews with journalism trainers, 
members of the news media, civil society, the NGO sector and government. The 
fourth set o f data is an accumulated body of news releases, journal and newspaper 
articles which serves to buttress the data from the other three sources. In order to 
make comparisons, this study utilizes the indices o f internationally recognized NGOs 
that work in the area of political development: Freedom House, Amnesty Interna­
tional, Reporters Without Borders, Article 19, Transparency International and others 
where noted. From this data, the charts and tables were composed.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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3.2 Data
Source documents indicate that these countries have received Canadian media
assistance o f some kind since 1990:
Afghanistan NF~Bi Congo NF~ Kenya PF+ Senegal F+
ladesh PF~ Cote D’Ivoire NF- Philippines F~ Serbia F~
Benin F~ Cuba NF~ Rwanda NF~ Sierra Leone PF+
Bolivia PF- Djibouti PF+ Mali F~ Slovakia F~
Bosnia PF+ Ecuador PF~ Malawi PF- Somalia NF~
Botswana F~ Egypt NF~ Nigeria PF+ South Africa F~
Burkina Faso PF~ Ethiopia PF~ Nicaragua PF~ Sudan NF~
Cambodia NF~ Georgia PF~ Peru F+ Tanzania PF~
Chad NF~ Guatemala PF~ Poland F~ Thailand F~
Chile F~ Iraq NF~ Russia PF-
(F = Free; PF = Partially Free; NF = Not Free. ~ = no change; + positive change; - = 
negative change over past ten years: data from 2004 Freedom House Annual Re­
port.194 Note: In mid-2005, Freedom House downgraded Russia to “Not free” status 
indicating that the 2005 Annual Report will list Russia as NF. The media on the is­
land of Zanzibar in Tanzania are highly restricted.)
The vast majority o f media interventions were in Africa (20), seven interventions 
were in Latin America, six were in Asia, and six were in Europe. The distribution 
reflects compelling political circumstances: immediately following the break up of 
the Soviet Union, all forms of aid poured into the former Soviet satellites, e.g. Po­
land. Likewise, the disintegration of Yugoslavia demanded interventions in both 
Serbia and Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Russia’s regression in some areas o f political 
development continues to attract the attention of the international community. The 
most recent interventions in Africa and Asia reflect the on-going challenges and ir­
regular development of states in each of these regions and perhaps Canada’s stated 
intention of focusing increased aid on Africa. Of the above list 12 of 39 are consid­
194 Freedom House data available from http://www.freedomhouse.oig/index.html.
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ered free, 16 partly free and 11 not free. Therefore, 27 of 39 or 69 percent are not 
considered free even after media assistance interventions.195
The amount of media assistance funding committed by Canada varies wildly. The 
following chart indicates some o f the Canadian media assistance funding received by 
select countries.
1,5 Although Freedom House does compile a Press Freedom Ranking and this study is an examination of media 
development, Freedom House’s composite index is used to indicate the progress of overall freedom in individual 
states, because media freedom is influenced by other factors, and freedom of the media also influences overall 
freedoms within a polity.
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Just as funding to individual countries varies wildly, Canada’s funding to NGOs 
and other organizations is unequal. The following chart shows Canadian ODA for 
media assistance distributed through select organizations since 1990:196
Figure 2: Major NGO/IGO recipients of media ODA (Canadian $)
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(DCFRN: Developing Countries Farm Radio Network; CJFE: Canadian Journalists for Free Expres­
sion; IPS: Inter Press Service; 1MPACS: Institute for Media, Politics and Civil Society)
These charts show the scale o f Canada's media assistance. They tell us two things: first, 
we can see which countries and which regions have received the largest share of media 
ODA. Second, the chart above shows that Ottawa on the one hand distributes media ODA 
to Canadian NGOs disproportionately, on the other hand it also commits large amounts of 
ODA to multi-national organizations such as the World Bank. These charts are useful in 
drawing attention to the prominent organizations and to the states/regions that are large re-
196 May not be a comprehensive list. Figures draws from available CIDA documents.
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cipients of media ODA. They do not show us the unique characteristics of an intervention, 
the situation of the recipient state at the time of the intervention and the recipient state's 
continuing development, or the circumstances surrounding the timing of the intervention 
itself. As well, looking only at Canadian data does not take into consideration the assis­
tance, or the lack thereof, from other sources that may have influenced the outcome of the 
transition.
3.3 Analysis of Data
As stated above, the analysis o f data in this study is used qualitatively to find a 
relationship, if any, between Canada’s media assistance interventions and political 
development rather than a quantifiable equation predicting political development. 
This study uses two types of examples, drawn from data, above, in qualitative analy­
sis: first, an analysis o f selected organizations that work in the area o f media assis­
tance and receive Canadian media ODA; second, select examples o f countries that 
have received Canadian media ODA. The findings and discussion that emerge from 
these examples are discussed in chapter IV.
Example #1 -  Organizations: World Bank. DCFRN. CJFE
The World Bank is a multi-lateral institution funding a wide number o f programs 
with the intent of promoting good governance in developing world states, specifi­
cally in tackling corruption. One o f the ways o f aiding governments to root out cor­
ruption, according to the World Bank, is through effective media.197 Canada, per its 
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forts, including a grant of $400,000 to "promote professional awareness o f the issues 
of corruption and a sense of commitment to and responsibility in investigative jour­
nalism; to encourage self-regulation in the journalism field through the development 
of appropriate codes of conduct; and to strengthen the regional capacity to deliver 
additional Investigative Journalism Workshops through partner organizations, in­
cluding the Nigerian Guild o f Editors and the Commonwealth Broadcasting Associa­
tion."198
The Developing Countries Farm Radio Network (DCFRN) is a Canadian NGO 
that provides radio agricultural educational scripts for partner-broadcasters in the de­
veloping world. Occasionally these scripts address socio-political issues, such as 
child labour and women's rights, which can be contentious.199 Thus, while DCFRN 
is not a journalistic NGO per se, it engages in a kind of current affairs journalism 
that permeates the civil society o f a state by addressing these issues. Media assis­
tance of this kind may have inadvertent consequences.
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) is a Canadian NGO active in the 
promotion of free speech and free media. It is selected because, unlike the World 
Bank and DCFRN, CJFE is clearly a journalistic NGO: it trains journalism and sup­
ports the advancement of free speech and journalism through various endeavours. 
The origin of CJFE dates to 1981 when the Canadian Association o f Journalists, then 
known as the Centre for Investigative Journalism, created a committee dedicated to 
campaigning against the kidnapping, torture and murder of journalists throughout 
Latin America. This committee became the Canadian Committee to Protect Joumal-
1,8 CIDA News Release available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountty.nsf/
199 DCFRN scripts available from http://www.fatmiadio.org/eng/scripts.php#subjectl3
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ists (CCPJ) which, in turn, evolved into the CJFE. CJFE now also manages the free­
dom of expression clearing house, The International Freedom of Expression Ex­
change (IFEX).200 CJFE is an advocate for free speech and journalists' rights around 
the world. It aids journalists in distress and those who have been exiled from their 
homelands, and it has operated media rebuilding and training interventions on behalf 
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Additionally, CJFE receives on-going funding to sustain its activities. For example, 
CJFE received $80,000 in 1999 in sustainability funding from CIDA.202 Including 
sustainability funding, the above list o f CIDA disbursements shows that at the mini­
mum more than one million dollars has been granted to CJFE since 1993. The fol­
lowing chart shows the course o f political development in the five countries that re­
ceived the single largest amounts o f aid through CJFE, based on Freedom House 
rankings (0= Free; 10= Not Free)203:
-♦ -M alaw i 
—■— Cambodia 
South Africa 
A  Thailand 
—3*— Sierra Leone
Of the five countries selected, South Africa has shown the most progress in the tran­
sition to a free society. Thailand has shown promise but remains mired at a level 
Freedom House considers only partially free. Sierra Leone, while only partially free 
according to Freedom House, is advancing in fits and starts. Cambodia has occasion­
ally made advances yet is today not free. Malawi is clearly showing a trend away 
from the advancement o f freedom In terms of press freedom specifically, in 2004 
Freedom House lists South Africa as free, Thailand, Malawi and Sierra Leone as
-Ha
202 CIDA intranet reporting
203 Freedom House is an internationally recognized NGO working for the advancement o f democracy and freedom 
around the world. Freedom House publishes an annual index of freedom in die world available at 
http://www.freedcmhousc.otg/iftdcxhtm. The above chart
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partly free, and Cambodia as not free.204 Each of these countries is examined more 
closely, below.
Example #2 -  recipient country analyses:
This set o f examples is broken down into regional blocs for easier comparison. 
Africa 
1. Nigeria
Nigeria has long been a target o f Western news media ODA. For example, in 
1951 the British Government donated to Nigeria the mobile beachhead transmitter 
used by the BBC to report on the invasion o f Normandy in World War II.205 It was a 
transfer of technology — albeit seven-year-old technology. Nigeria has been the sub­
sequent target o f Western media training initiatives for many years. In 1961, during 
the height o f the height o f orthodox development theory, the Jackson College of 
Journalism at the University o f Nigeria was established with a US-style curricu­
lum.206 A generation o f Nigerian journalists was consequently imbued with Western 
journalistic principles. Given this record o f Western involvement in the development 
and promotion o f Western media, Nigeria thus provides the opportunity to examine 
an on-going, long-term transition. It is pertinent to this study because o f the afore 
mentioned CIDA grant to the World Bank.
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Today, Nigeria is listed by Freedom House as only partly free. The following 
chart, based on Freedom House rankings, shows the progress o f freedom in Nigeria 
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As the chart indicates, Nigeria's record o f progressing toward free speech and media 
rights has been inconsistent. Notice also that Nigeria’s media ranking has slipped 
since CJFE’s 1999 intervention after showing initial promise o f progress toward me­
dia freedom. At present, RSF notes that in Nigeria, "Police violence against journal­
ists continued. Despite a slight improvement, press freedom was still precarious in 
the north of the country. The authorities also have their sights on the foreign news 
media."208 Wracked through its post-colonial history by internal conflict and coups 
d'etat, after a brief period of political development in the early 1980s Nigeria re­
gressed in the 1990s. Nigeria continues to grapple with many o f the same issues to­
day. Officially, Nigeria has historically supported freedom of expression. A guaran­
tee of it was included in the 1960 Bill o f Rights. However, freedom o f expression 
has neither been viewed as necessary nor significant in the development process in
Freedom House data: http://wy.fceed<amkoiise.org/indeg.htm
208 http://wwwjrsiorg/caantry-36.php3?id_mot=551&VaEder=OK
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Nigeria.209 As a result, critical reporting was often viewed as being in opposition to 
development.210 Development of Nigerian civil society has been harmed by the dec­
ades of political turmoil. Professional organizations remain weak. Assassinations of 
politicians and officials still occur. Variations on Sharia law are in effect in Nigerian 
states with Muslim majorities. Religious conflict, especially between Muslims and 
Christians, hinders political development. In terms of progress toward good govern­
ance, Nigeria is the second most corrupt country in the world on Transparency Inter­
national's Corruption Perception Index, beating out only Bangladesh for the world's 
most corrupt state.211 It is this weak spot in Nigeria's development that CIDA ap­
pears to be targeting in the 2002 contribution to the World Bank Institute: "The pro­
ject will create a corps of up to 280 Nigerian journalists and editors who take a keen 
interest in investigating and uncovering corrupt practices in the public and private 
sector, in a professional and balanced manner".212 Nigeria has a promising founda­
tion for journalistic development: its mass media is second only to South Africa in 
size and complexity within the African media context. More than one hundred radio 
and television stations operate in the country.213 However, the practice of journalism 
is fraught with danger. Journalists are harassed and threatened, including through
209 Robert Martin, “Freedom of Expression in Africa” in Communicating Democracy. The Media and Political 
Transition- ed. Patrick H. O'Neil (London: Rienner, 1998), 69.
210 Martin, 69.
211 Transparency International available at www.ttansparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.eniitml
212 Canada. Cida. Available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/webcountry.nsf/
213 Louise M. Bourgault, “Nigeria: The Politics of Confusion,” in Communicating Democracy. The Media and Po­
litical Transition- ed. Patrick H. O'Neil (London: Rienner, 1998), 91
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religious fatwas.214 The current president, Olusegun Obasanjo, appears to be re­
sponding to international pressure and is cracking down on corruption.
3. South Africa
Of the CJFE's interventions, South Africa is perhaps the most successful. South 
Africa made a peaceful transition to democratic government post-Apartheid and it 
remains a democracy which has passed the test o f peaceful turnover. We can see in 
South Africa a number o f indicators that appear to be closely tied to political devel­
opment and the progress o f plural independent media. Data tell us that South Africa 
has one o f the highest rates o f literacy and education in Africa (Adult literacy = 86%; 
89% complete primary education; 119th on HDI). It is the economic engine of south­
ern Africa. In terms o f leadership, the role o f Nelson Mandela cannot be over stated. 
The charisma and dignity o f this individual established an important example to the 
nation. The transition in South Africa was also aided by other strong leaders. F.W. 
de Klerk led the white community through transition to black, majority rule. Des­
mond Tutu headed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. South Africa has a 
strong civil society that includes COSATU, the congress o f South African trade un­
ions, and a network of professional associations and community groups. The inter­
national community is deeply engaged in the South African political transition.
There has been sustained multi-sector commitment to political development. In ad­
dition to giving media assistance, Canada has funded South African constitutional 
development, provided support for the judicial system including the training of
214 http://www.articlel9.org/
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judges, and governance aid.215 The transition o f South Africa has also been aided by 
a heavy commitment and clear focus of Western governments to the process of 
peaceful reform at all levels of political development, the media being but one.
5. Sierra Leone
"The government continued to look askance at the independent press. Corruption was 
still a taboo subject and the few journalists who dared to write about embezzlement 
within the state apparatus paid the price."
~RSF Sierra Leone 2004 Annual Report216
Of the five CJFE interventions selected for examination, Sierra Leone is the most 
recent to make a transition. Peace was reached in early 2002 ending a decade-long 
civil war. A 17,000 member United Nations peacekeeping force succeeded in dis­
arming 70,000 rebels and a war crimes court is seeking to bring the worst perpetra­
tors of atrocities in the civil war to justice. CIDA supplied the funds for CJFE to buy 
a press in Canada and transport it to the Sierra Leonean capital, Freetown, a press 
from which fifteen small newspapers are printed. In a follow-up project, CJFE has 
supplied bicycles so that delivery boys can haul the papers beyond the confines of 
the capital's core because CJFE realized the papers were not getting out o f the capital 
or even to the wider edge of the capital.217
215 Canada. CIDA. Available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/
216 http://www.rsf.oig/coun try-36.php3?id_mot=521&Valider=OK
217 Amber, interview with author.
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But Sierra Leone is beset by many challenges that limit the spread o f a plural and 
independent media. For one thing, illiteracy is very high outside of Freetown, which 
limits the penetration o f the print media. Sierra Leone ranks last on the UNDP's HDI; 
74.5% of the population live on less than two dollars a day.218 Given the very recent 
emergence of Sierra Leone from civil war, the UNDP has not yet been able to note a 
trend in the human development index. In terms of press freedom in Sierra Leone, 
RSF states that "The press is free as long as it does not poke its nose into anything 
troublesome. This seemed to sum up the government's position on free expression. 
Corruption was by far and away the most sensitive subject. Whenever a journalist 
tried to denounce embezzlement or fraud involving senior officials, the authorities 
used and abused everything in their judicial arsenal to fight back."219 Dining the 
civil war, journalists were killed with impunity. Today, journalists in Sierra Leone 
continue to be harassed, attacked and imprisoned. A radio commentator recently ran 
afoul o f a tribal chief, who closed down the station he worked for.220 Amnesty Inter­
national notes in a 2004 report that despite some progress in rehabilitating the na­
tional justice system, "serious problems persist in the effective ad ministration o f jus­
tice. There were few incentives for qualified lawyers to become judges. Although 
magistrates’ courts were restored to all 12 districts, lack of magistrates remained a 
major constraint. Justices o f the peace were trained and deployed to help reduce 
lengthy backlogs o f cases. Criminal suspects continued to be held in police custody 
beyond legal limits, often because o f lack o f legal representation, especially in the
218 UNDP statistic available at http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indic/indic_12_l_l.html
219 Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) surveys available at http://www.rsf.org/
220 RSF available from http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15031.
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*221provinces.
6. Malawi
"There has been recurring violence against journalists for several years, and the 
authorities have not always punished those responsible. But they did promise to stop 
arresting journalists."
~RSF Malawi Annual Report 2004222
CJFE's intervention in Malawi occurred at an important turning point in Malawi's 
transition. After twenty years o f one-party rule under Banda, multi-party elections 
were held in 1994. Today, Malawi is beset by social and political problems. Its 
economy remains predominantly agrarian. HIV/AIDS and malaria are serious chal­
lenges. There continues to be political tension between the current president and his 
predecessor, who tried but failed to stay in office through constitutional change. The 
current president, Bingu Wa Muthurika, has split with his former political party over 
resistance to his efforts to fight corruption. Malawi is 165th out o f the 177 countries 
on the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) Human Development Index 
(HDI).223 Worse, Malawi has begun to trend downward since 1995, after ascending 
in the HDI for twenty years. Malawi has plummeted in Transparency International's 
Corruption Perceptions Index. From a high of 43rd place in 2000, Malawi is mired in 
2004 in the 90th place.224 There have been improvements in literacy (1990=51.8%
221 Amnesty International reports available from http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/sle-summary-eng.
222 RSF surveys available from http://www.rs£org/country-36.php3?id_mot=547&Va]ider=OK.
223 United Nations Human Development Index available from http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/indices/.
224 Transparency International rankings available from http://ww w.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi.
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ages 15 above literate; 2002=61.8% ages 15 and above literate) but the percentage of 
children reaching grade five has fallen dramatically between 1990 and 2002 
(1990=64%; 2002=54%).225 Amnesty International notes that in 2004 there was an 
"overall decline in freedom o f expression" as well as harassment and imprisonment 
of journalists.25* Malawi is regressing not only in speech and media rights but also in 
political and human development. From a promising start to political transition in 
the early 1990s, Malawi appears to be reversing course as the above chart indicates. 
What has happened? Arnold Amber, the President o f CJFE and a television producer 
with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) worked as a trainer in the Ma­
lawi intervention. Amber acknowledges failure in the Malawi project which, he says, 
was due to the government's failure to ensure the rights of the media. "The govern­
ment wouldn't let the broadcaster be more liberal and y'know, you only sometimes 
find out the true intent o f the people when you're already in the training program." 
Amber recalls that the Minister of Information in Malawi at the time o f the interven­
tion was himself the owner o f a newspaper. Amber considers this to be a flagrant 
violation of the separation o f the media and the state 227 "The people in Malawi said, 
you train us and we'll be more liberal. It turned out they weren't more liberal at all."
225 UNDP http://hdr.vindp.org/statistics/data/c1y/cty_f_MWI.html
226 http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/mwi-summary-eng
227 Arnold Amber interview with author
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Middle East 
1. Iraq
The long-term viability o f plural independent media in Iraq is obviously in flux.
Under Saddam Hussein there were no free speech and media, only government
mouthpieces and the Ba'ath party propaganda machine. With the removal o f Saddam
and US occupation, independent media have flourished. There are now more than
one hundred newspapers being published and numerous radio and television stations
on the air. Indeed, the United States boasts that it has given Iraqis free speech along
with the other rights denied to them for decades. It is in this void that Canada hopes
to advance plural, independent media with a $500,000 grant to IMP ACS to:
"assess the role o f Iraqi media within Iraq and the Middle East and 
propose programming for ongoing collaboration with Canadian media 
to enhance, strengthen and further professionalize Iraqi and regional media. 
The initiative includes a three-day intensive training program for Iraqi 
journalists to expose them to basic journalism, including future reporting 
on elections processes. The initiative will help shape longer-term media de­
velopment programming for the region".228
IMP ACS is collaborating in the Iraq project with another member o f Canada's media 
NGO community, Montreal-based Reseau Liberte.
With regard to examining specifically the impact o f the media in political devel­
opment, the access to free and independent media appears to be partly or wholly out 
of the reach o f the government. Consequently, it is difficult to discern if  the failure 
to achieve such rights is due to neglect or malevolent government activity, or if other 
societal factures such as poverty are to blame.229 RSF calls Iraq a very serious situa­
tion, having been unable to issue an Iraq annual report since the fall o f Saddam Hus­
228 Canada. CIDA. Available from http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vPrintNewsReleaseEn/
229 Neumayer, 652.
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sein. The general lack o f security threatens all Iraqis but journalists may be targeted 
because o f what they do and the high visibility the profession demands. The sectar­
ian nature o f Iraq, which is apparent in the dispute over the makeup o f the governing 
council and constitution, could hinder media pluralism. In a state where there are 
strong sectarian divisions and the state media are not trusted, the individual who does 
not seek alternative points o f view may stay within the confines o f his or her com­
munity's media. Shi'a may be inclined to read Shi'a newspapers, watch Shi'a TV and 
listen to Shi'a radio, thereby receiving information and editorial opinion that are not 
plural. The same may go for Sunni and Kurds, which is a cultural/linguistic group 
rather than a sect. This has been confirmed by IMP ACS.230 A Middle Eastern ex­
ample o f this sectarian split can be seen in Lebanon, where the secular supporters of 
the late Rafik Hariri tend to watch his family’s television network while supporters 
of Hizb'Allah watch that organization's news, information and cultural programming. 
The state media are not relevant. The NGO Index on Censorship issued a December 
2004 report titled, "Options for Media Development in Iraq"231 In it, Index on Cen­
sorship notes that the instability in Iraq poses both tremendous reward and immense 




23° Michel Comte, Michel, National Post. 28 Match 2005, A9
231 Index on Censorship report available from http://www.indexonline.org/en/pdfs/kaq-media-development- 
intemational.pdf
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Thailand has shown promise in the progress in political transition, including free 
speech and media rights since the military handed over power to civilians in 1992. 
However, there are indications that political development is regressing in Thailand, 
with speech and media rights leading the decline. RSF refers to Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra as the Asian equivalent o f Italy's Silvio Berlusconi. Shinawatra 
and Thai armed forces own several radio and television stations.232 RSF declares that 
there are noticeable problems in Thailand’s media: "(The Prime Minister and the 
armed forces) tried to silence their most vocal critics. But the privately-owned Thai 
and English-language media are resisting."233 The print media in Thailand have been, 
until recently, one of the freest in Asia but, as in other parts o f the developing world, 
journalists are killed and harassed in performing their duties. Shinawatra's recent 
domination at the polls has turned Thailand into a virtual one-party-state which may 
threaten its youthful democracy. Conflicts with Cambodia and unrest in the Muslim 
south o f the country have led to the imposition of martial law, denial o f rights and 
censorship of the media. This is an obvious retreat from the glowing situation de­
scribed by CIDA just last year.234 Indeed, there has been a further decline in media 
freedom in Thailand of late. Shinawatra makes no secret o f the fact that he believes 
media should “serve the country”; the result has been that to appease the government 
more than twenty news editors have been fired, re-assigned or had their work modi­
fied between 2001 and 2004.235 In July, Shinawatra was granted the power to impose 
outright censorship on media in the country’s south, leading the Thai Journalists’ As­
232 RSF survey available from http://www .rsf.org/coun try-50.php3?id_mot=266&Valider=OK.
233 RSF survey available from http:/ / www.rsf.org/coun try-50.php3?id_mot=266&Valider=OK.
^Canada. CIDA. http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_md.nsf/
235 Sam Zari£ Globe and Mail. 19 July 2004
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sociation to declare that the Thai media now faces its greatest threat in modern his­
tory.236
2. Philippines
Although Canada is not currently aggressively intervening in media assistance in 
the Philippines,237 past interventions have supported the work o f indigenous NGOs 
such as the Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and Canada pres­
ently participates in the political transition o f the Philippines on many levels.238 As a 
developing world state that is nearly twenty years into a political transition following 
the overthrow of Marcos in 1986, the Philippines provides useful comparisons with 
media assistance interventions currently underway.
The Philippines has among one o f the freest news media in Asia. There are few 
restrictions placed on journalists by the state and there is a healthy investigative ethic 
led by groups such as PCIJ which are ostensibly dedicated to uncovering corruption 
and ensuring transparency in government. However, Filipino media are beset by a 
number o f challenges. Ownership o f the media rests in the hands of the wealthy. A 
few dominant families’ ownership crosses the barrier between print and electronic 
media. News coverage overwhelmingly concentrates on the political grievances and 
disputes in Congress, which is likewise dominated by the wealthy and the scions of 
prominent Filipino families. Many o f the issues confronting the masses o f Filipino
236 BBC News 19 July 2005, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetoold/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- 
pacific/469579.stm
237 Canada currently funds the annual McLuhan Award to a Filipino journalist The award provides for travel and 
accommodation in Canada for three weeks each year to study Canadian journalism available from 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nianila/statspik/2005-01-05b-en.asp.
238 Recent support for the elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) available from 
http:/ / www.dfait-maed.gc.ca/manila/statspik/2005-08-12-ennsp
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poor are dealt with sparingly. Also, there are two distinct journalistic communities 
in the Philippines. The urban media, in large cities such as Manila and Cebu, do not 
face the same challenges as their colleagues in outlying provinces. Journalism is a 
dangerous occupation outside the large cities. By mid-August, six members o f the 
media had been assassinated in 2005 alone. Since 1986, more than fifty members of 
the media had lost their lives because o f their work.239 Not all o f these members of 
the media are truly journalists, however, despite the description o f them as such by 
well-meaning journalistic advocacy organizations. Rather, they are high- decibel 
commentators who flout the law and journalistic convention. As for legitimate jour­
nalists, many o f them do not have formal journalistic training, which contributes to a 
lack of professionalism. Also, journalists are poorly paid, a situation exploited by 
politicians who engage in “envelopmental journalism” —payments o f small amounts 
of cash for favourable coverage which is an accepted practice outside o f large centres. 
Other forms o f payments are made in large urban areas.240
3. Cambodia
"Cambodia was viewed as the good boy of South-East Asia as regards press free­
dom. Violence against journalists and censorship became more and more infrequent. 
Nonetheless, almost all the broadcast media were controlled by the associates of
239 Rachel Kahn, Director, Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Makati, Philippines, interview with author 
27 July 2005.
240 Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Professor, University of the Philppines, Mindanao. Interview with author 23 August 2005.
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Prime Minister Hun Sen. These media gave limited space to the opposition in the 
municipal elections o f February 2002. "241
Cambodia is a repeat recipient o f Canadian media assistance. Not only has CJFE 
provided training assistance to Cambodia in 1995 (see table), IMP ACS received a 
$300,000 grant to provide media training there in 1999. That is nearly $400,000 dol­
lars granted to two different media assistance NGOs in a five-year period yet, as the 
graph illustrates, Freedom House continues to rank Cambodia as not free. The coun­
try's legal system was decimated by the Khmer Rouge to the point where there are 
few lawyers, while judges are ill-trained and highly corruptible.242 Amnesty Interna­
tional calls Cambodia's justice system "disastrous”, replete with secret trials and con­
fessions extracted through beatings by police rushing to judgement.243 In terms of 
social development, Cambodia ranks 130th on the United Nations Development Pro­
gram (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI)244 but is making slow but steady 
progress in raising its HDI since the UNDP began tracking Cambodian development 
in 1995.245 Literacy is 69.4 percent (age fifteen and above) and GDP per capita is 
$2,060 (USD).246 Regarding the current state o f Cambodian media, it would appear, 
looking at statistics, that the country has the foundation for plural media. RSF notes 
that Cambodia has 260 newspapers, 37 radio stations and 43 TV channels, 21 of
241 RSF Cambodia 2003 Annual Report available from h ttp ://  www.rsf.org/country-
242 Transparency International rankings available from at http://www.transparency.Mg/newsletters/995/reports
243 Amnesty International survey available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
244 UNDP statistics available fromhttp://www.undp.org/
245 UNDP statistics available from http://hdr.undp.Mg/statistics/data/indic/indic_12_l_l.html 
244 UNDP statistics available from http://hdr.undp.Mg/statistics/data/cty/cty_f.KHMhtml
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them accessible by cable. However, according to RSF, "the ruling party is second to 
no one in controlling and manipulating the media on its behalf. The prime minister 
and his allies control seven TV and radio stations."247 Opposition parties and jour­
nalists are murdered, threatened and harassed, with the anemic legal structure siding 
with complainants against the media. The Cambodian government does not, how­
ever, appear openly hostile to NGO intervention in the media sector. Last year, Arti­
cle 19 held it’s first-ever freedom o f information workshop in Cambodia.248 Regard­




Media freedom in Russia has declined to the point where Freedom House has 
downgraded Russia’s ranking to not free this year. There are many reasons for this, 
according to RSF: "Government efforts to take control o f the media and curb press 
freedom were accompanied in 2002 by imprisonment, new restrictive laws, huge 
fines threatening the survival o f newspapers, arbitrary closures, searches and seizure 
of just-printed newspapers. The targets were media and journalists who were too in­
dependent or critical o f the authorities."250 Of late, Russian authorities have simply 
denied visas to foreign reporters seeking to enter the country, reflecting a bold and
247 RSF surveys available from http://www.rsf.org/ article.php3?id_article=101598cvar_recherche=cambodia
248 Article 19 Quarterly Newsletter (Autumn 2004) available at http://www.articlel9.org/
249 http://www.transparency.org/ newsletters/2002.2/country_work.html#cambodia
250 RSF 2003 Russia Annual Report available from http://wwwrsf.org/country-
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growing disregard for any semblance of media freedom in Russia -  a model which is 
being copied in the former Soviet republics to the south.251
2. Bosnia
The news media in Bosnia, although free, are not plural. As noted previously, 
where there is strong sectarian division, the likelihood of individuals reading, view­
ing or listening to the "other's" media is less than in a unitary state. That is the case 
in Bosnia. Also, the state-controlled media have frequently countenanced biased re­
portage at the urging of Western, in particular US, advisors. This has led some 
commentators to criticize the entire premise o f media assistance:
".... there is more than a slight danger that the Bosnia model o f media control may 
become the norm in future nation-building enterprises. One can hardly imagine a bet­
ter way of engendering cynicism and anger toward the West among the populations 
of target countries. The lesson being conveyed is that the West's real definition of 
freedom of the press is the freedom to air views favored by Western authorities."252
These examples are selective. A comprehensive index o f all post-Cold War me­
dia assistance interventions may indeed yield success stories. However, the creation 
of such an index is not the purpose o f this study. Rather, this study seeks to uncover 
failures o f media assistance interventions in contemplating the reasons for failures -  
to challenge the assumption that free, independent, plural news media are attainable
251 Committee to Protect Journalists; http://www.cpj.org/regions_05/europe_05/europe_05.html
252 Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Jackboot Nation Building: The West Brings Democracy to Bosnia,” Mediterranean Ouar- 
ledy 112 (2000): 11.
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and a universal principle of political development. Some of the reasons for the fail­
ures of media assistance interventions are noted in the findings and discussion, below.
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Chapter IV: Findings and Discussion
4.1 Description of Findings
The finding most easily arrived at, is that Canada’s media assistance interventions 
yield highly inconsistent outcomes. Although this study is not a historical analysis 
of all Canadian media assistance interventions, it is obvious interventions that yield 
clearly positive outcomes are few, many recipient states show neither progress or de­
cline of media rights and access post-intervention (which may be interpreted as fail­
ures, assuming that an intervention is undertaken because of the dismal state o f the 
media to begin with), and some states have clearly regressed. Why outcomes are in­
consistent can be attributed to many factors.
A key factor may be that Canada simply spreads its media assistance ODA across 
too many countries and NGOs, and expectations are too broad. Attempting to ad­
vance the media in more than 39 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America 
since 1990 is bound to pose challenges of devising consistent programming and out­
comes given the diversity among states. By relying to such a degree on multiple 
NGOs, which may have distinct mandates, for intervention design and delivery, deci­
sion-making is one step removed from policy-making. This distance is further exac­
erbated when funding is handed over to a non-Canadian organization such as the 
World Bank. As illustrated by the examples in 3.2, media assistance falls into multi­
ple priorities and sectors -  media assistance seems to be expected to accomplish too 
many goals.
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Another factor explaining inconsistent outcomes may be that the underlying 
premise behind media assistance interventions as they are currently conceived is 
flawed. Corresponding with Whitehead’s contention that insisting on standardized 
outcomes regardless o f context or resources is both historically and culturally insen­
sitive,253 the assumption that there is a template of basic journalistic norms that can 
be universally applied ignores the diverse realities o f developing world states. Re­
calling that even in the West the media are themselves constantly undergoing change 
while checked by long-standing laws, regulations, ethics, social mores, and advanced 
political structures, a weakness or breakdown in any o f these aspects in a transitional 
state can easily affect the success o f media assistance interventions. Drawing upon 
the above examples, some o f the more salient aspects o f political development that 
have affected the success o f media assistance interventions follow.
Power, Carrothers contends, is the "missing link" of democratic development.254 
Media assistance cannot be folly effective without understanding the power structure 
o f the state into which the aid is going. Power in the hands o f an enlightened leader 
may lead to political development. In the hands of another leader, power may hinder 
political development. The success o f a media assistance intervention depends on 
the power relationships in the recipient states. A leader’s inclination to promoting 
media freedom is a determinant. Related to this, a leader who has the ability to use 
the media to his or her advantage may be more tolerant of an independent media; one 
who has difficult relations with the media may tend to control or restrict journalists, 
or favour lapdog reporters. As Whitehead reminds us, "[Tjhe most essential aspect of
253 Whitehead, 13.
254 Crawford, Part II. 3.
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political leadership is the capacity to persuade -  and perhaps inspire -  others".255 In 
democratic transitions, when the political changes may be immense, citizens need to 
be "guided, reassured and persuaded by convincing and authoritative leaders". In 
such situations, leaders who master the range of performance arts, particularly in the 
modern electronic media, may use the media to advance political development. The 
example of Yeltsin climbing on a tank in front of the Duma in 1991 is one of the 
“open and unstructured performances that are often required in the course of democ­
ratic transitions”.256 Mandela, de Klerk and Tutu were pivotal in managing South 
Africa’s political transition this way, it seems; their leadership may have left a leg­
acy of tolerance and openness reflected in South Africa’s media today. Malawian 
leadership, on the other hand, has shown little inclination to developing free and in­
dependent media. The decline o f media rights and access presently in Thailand and 
Russia seems to coincide with the ascension of leaders with autocratic tendencies. 
The absence o f support for independent media at the top is apparently directly related 
to the failure to advance media rights and access. Consequently, is an intervention in 
a state where leadership has no inclination to advance media rights money well-spent?
Even in a state where the leader is inclined to support a liberal journalistic 
environment, weak ‘linkages’ may hinder successful media assistance interventions. 
Crawford, borrowing from Schmitter and Brouwer, uses the concepts o f ‘micro’, 
‘meso’ and ‘macro’ linkages. This is a useful guide for studying media assistance. 
‘Micro’ is the local level o f programming, such as the training o f journalists.
‘Meso’ is the sectoral or thematic level o f programming (the level most often over-
255 Whitehead, 43.
2“  Whitehead, 43.
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looked in the "tendency to jump directly from micro-level impact analysis to judg­
ments about impact on national political change"),257 which might include the devel­
opment of journalistic support within civil society. The ‘macro’ level o f linkage is 
national impact, for example, aiding in the development of meaningful constitutional 
guarantees o f free speech and free media and the rule o f law surrounding journalistic 
rights. Crawford argues his three-level methodology, by including the ‘meso’ stra­
tum of evaluation, finds the “missing middle” or the linkage that is often missing in 
studies that “tend to assume rather than to prove the impact o f individual projects on 
the entire process o f democratization”.258 In this comparison, the success o f a media 
assistance intervention may depend on the linkages between levels. A ‘micro’ level 
intervention may fail because there is no support at the ‘meso’ and ‘macro’ levels. 
South Africa has received extensive, long-term support for its judicial institutions 
from the international community and has a strong indigenous civil society (such as 
an active union movement), suggesting healthy linkages within which a free media 
can flourish. Canada has supported judicial development in Cambodia along with its 
media assistance, yet media development is irregular suggesting a breakdown in 
linkages elsewhere. In the Philippines, although civil society is lively and NGOs are 
active across the entire spectrum of political development, journalists in outlying ar­
eas are threatened with assault, if  not assassination. An enduring patron-client re­
gime and unequal power distribution o f other kinds, as well as unique problems 
within the journalistic community itself, challenge journalistic development there. A 
mostly dysfunctional political system and a culture of impunity in which the rule of
257 Crawford,Parti. 5.
258 Crawford. Part II. 87.
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law is defied clearly hinder journalistic development in the Philippines and else­
where in the developing world. Media development cannot occur on its own: it re­
quires linkages across the political spectrum, or at least, strong linkages in key areas 
such as law and civil society.
All things being equal, the social development of a state at the time of interven­
tion appears to have an impact on the success o f media assistance as well. Plural in­
dependent media in a state that has, say, high illiteracy and low levels o f education, 
will be more difficult to achieve in a culture that has higher levels o f literacy and 
education. The examples show that there may be a correlation: South Africa has 
relatively high levels o f literacy and education; Cambodia less so than South Africa 
in each of these areas; Malawi has relatively low levels o f both literacy and educa­
tion compared with other states. Data such as this may tell us whether a print inter­
vention has a chance to succeed, or whether a broadcast intervention would be better, 
or if a media assistance intervention o f any kind has a prospect of succeeding. We 
can also use data to tell us other conditions o f a recipient state: Is it corrupt? Is it 
poor? These are factors which may influence the success o f an intervention. But 
data is limited in what it can tell us about a political transition. It alone cannot tell 
us everything. Media assistance interventions are often latent. To be fair, the end of 
the Cold War unleashed a series o f political events that were unpredictable, and 
arguably remain so. This uncertain aid environment poses a dilemma: in some cases, 
media assistance interventions target blank-slate states emerging from decades of 
conflict such as Sierra Leone. On the other hand, interventions target states such as 
Nigeria -  a long-term beneficiary o f media assistance. The dilemma lies in
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reconciling nuances of strategy which, to be fair, CIDA attempts to do: in Sierra 
Leone CIDA is trying to build the basic foundations of journalism, whereas in Nige­
ria CIDA is attempting to advance journalism to the next stage, to build upon an ex­
isting foundation of journalism by trying to foment a culture o f investigation among 
journalists and, therefore, root out corruption and advance good governance where it 
is lacking. Regardless o f design, in either example interventions are following po­
litical events that have, evidently, drawn CIDA’s attention. Otherwise, CIDA -  or 
more aptly the NGOs, would not be there. In a sense, then, media interventions in 
both these examples play catch-up to political events, positive or negative; they are 
latent.
Not only might media assistance interventions be late, a consistent criticism of 
media-freedom advocates in the developing world is that Western media assistance 
interventions also lack sustainability; they are not long-term interventions. The data 
from CIDA confirms that funding is mostly small and projects are o f short-duration. 
If they are to succeed, media projects must therefore be not only designed better in 
terms of who gets aid but they must also be sustained. Howard writes of how the 
1993 establishment o f Radio UNTAC in Cambodia "induced competitive media, 
which was credited in the massive, reasonably democratic vote", only to see Cambo­
dian media revert to its partisan form when Radio UNTAC was disbanded when the 
UN mandate ended.259 As illustrated above, Canadian media aid has subsequently 
flowed to Cambodia (in 1995 and again in 1999 -  an example o f repeat intervening) 
with little apparent impact on political development. If 1993 was a high point in
259 Howard, 21.
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Cambodia's recent political development, perhaps momentum toward free media and 
associated political development could have been sustained if donors had only more 
intently stayed the course. Effective promotion o f the media requires much more 
than a one-time commitment of funds for projects such as a turn-key transfer of tech­
nology, or a training seminar.
Another finding specific to Canada’s aid objectives is that Canadian media assis­
tance interventions do not seem to follow CIDA’s designated list o f nine countries 
targeted for specific concentration listed above in 3.2. Rather, CIDA funds media 
assistance on a haphazard basis: sometimes the impetus for an intervention comes 
from NGOs, sometimes CIDA suggests to NGOs which countries should be targeted 
by NGOs.260 Other times, CIDA grants money to multinational organizations such as 
the World Bank, which detaches funding from Canadian control. How CIDA selects 
countries for media assistance is not made clear in CIDA documents. Much criticism 
of CIDA has concentrated on its wide dispersal o f all forms o f ODA. CIDA itself 
acknowledges that aid is spread widely: "Canada has consistently been the least con­
centrated o f all the donor countries o f the DAC. In 1999-2000, the top 15 recipient 
countries o f Canada's aid program received 15.8 percent of Canada's total ODA. The 
donor country average was 25 percent and no other donor country gave less than 20 
percent o f its aid to its top 15 recipient countries."261 Since Canada's funding for 
media assistance, like other aspects o f Canadian ODA, is relatively small and spread 
across many states it is difficult to ascertain whether media interventions are effec­
tive, given the scale o f Canada's assistance. Consequently, the outcome o f a project -
260 Amber, interview with author..
261 Canada. CIDA. Making
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its success or failure - may be anomalous rather than part o f a larger trend. The em­
phasis should perhaps then lie in the "input" stage, that is, in the closer selection of 
states for intervention, especially if one accepts that outcomes are dependent on link­
ages. But in selecting countries for intervention, CIDA does not appear to employ a 
clearly defined programmatic approach to media assistance. This may in itself re­
flect the small scale o f Canada's media intervention -  that since assistance is negligi­
ble anyway, why bother establishing a programmatic approach?
Clearly, many assumptions about the efficacy of media assistance interventions 
do not match outcomes. For example, the Canadian NGO IMP ACS was commis­
sioned by CIDA in 2001 to develop a framework for the media and peace building.262 
It is an impressive academic document, replete with typologies o f interventions and 
useful indicators of crises. It also includes the boast that IMP ACS “since 1998 has 
strengthened democracy in Cambodia by assisting in the development o f more inde­
pendent, open and accountable radio journalism in the highly subjective and fractious 
media environment there.”263 Yet, as noted above, Cambodia’s record on free speech 
and free media hardly supports the contention that media is free, independent and 
open in the country. As recent as July 2005, the International Freedom o f Expression 
Exchange (IFEX) issued a memo protesting a crackdown on free speech in Cambo­
dia.264 The rhetoric o f NGOs must be viewed with skepticism.
Finally, Canada’s media assistance falls into a void o f accountability. Media as­
sistance interventions are not closely assessed for their effectiveness. Data on spend­
262 An operational framework for media and peacebuilding; available at http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/
263 Canada. CIDA. Available from (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/
264 Inernational Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) alerts available from http://www.ifex.org
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ing can be acquired, which is the foundation for this study, but it is ambiguously 
categorized. There is not coherent analysis o f media assistance outcomes. This may 
be due to the feet that the amounts o f money are trivial: does a $12,000 grant to 
CJFE in Nigeria really make a difference? Or, does $500,000 (not a trivial amount, 
certainly) spent in Russia actually advance the progress o f media rights in a country 
as vast, with an economy so large? CIDA seems due for a comprehensive analysis o f 
media assistance interventions.
4.2 Summary
This study is not a rejection of media assistance entirely. It may be that Western 
media assistance interventions can aid the progress o f political transitions in the de­
veloping world. As Wiarda notes, "indigenous, home-grown ideas and models o f 
development proved to be (except perhaps in east Asia) no more effective in actually 
promoting development than earlier theories had been, and they were often down­
right harmful".265 However, there are flaws within the current conception o f Western 
media assistance interventions, primarily that interventions are isolated from each 
other (e.g. governments may not coordinate efforts even though they are active in the 
same countries), the reality o f interventions do not correspond with funding govern­
ments’ assumptions (e.g. there appears to be an assumption that media assistance 
works without actual evidence that it does), interventions are often isolated from the 
cultural distinctions of recipient states (e.g. that Western journalistic practices may 
not be universal) and lastly, interventions are isolated from the factors that contribute 
to the establishment and sustainability o f an effective and reliable media, notably the
265 Howard Wiarda, "Hie Western Tradition and its Export to die Non-West," in Non-Western Theories of Devel­
opment. ed. Howard Wiarda, (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, 1999), 3.
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professionalism of journalists themselves and the actual conditions within recipient 
states. The list o f even the minimal enabling conditions can be very long. The afore 
mentioned 2001 Aspen Institute conference lists fourteen such conditions that must 
be promoted so that independent journalism can gain a foothold in a developing 
state.266 For the sake of brevity I summarize them here into four categories:
> journalistic professionalism
> enabling legal and legislative infrastructure
> meaningful protection of these rights, sustained by rule o f law.
> Security of journalists
Considering each o f these four in turn, one can clearly see the challenges inherent 
in achieving them. Advancing journalistic professionalism requires not only the 
training of working journalists but also developing an educational system, currently 
lacking, to train future journalists properly.267 The professionalism o f both current 
and future journalists is also tested by the low wages and corruption that is endemic 
to the developing world. How are these factors to be rectified? The goal of achiev­
ing enabling legal and legislative infrastructure specific to journalists is another for-
266 Aspen, 5
267 For an almost current analysis o f journalism training in Afiica see Wimmer and Wolf “Develoment Journalism 
Out of Date? An analysis of its significance in journalism education at African Universities ,” Munchener Beitrage 
zur Kommunilriationswissenschaft, 3 (May 2005). who find steady progress in the expansion in the number of 
journalism programs in Africa and a widening of curriculum. However, the pace of growth, while steady, is slow 
and many countries lack journalism programs entirely. Progress in establishing quality journalism programs else­
where in the developing wodd is mixed. For example, in the Philippines — a country known for its ‘diploma mills’
- there may be abundant journalism/communications programs, but they are of poor quality. Few reputable insti­
tutions offer advanced programs, which limits the number of qualified graduates entering newsrooms throughout 
the country and those who do tend to gravitate to the metropolitan centres.
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midable task. After all, legal and legislative rights that are applicable and meaning­
ful to wide sectors o f developing world populations are yet to be achieved. Simi­
larly, the meaningful protection o f journalists’ rights requires judicial reform, includ­
ing an honest, impartial judiciary and a security and police apparatus that is not cor­
rupt. How can journalists’ rights be secured when others’ rights are not, where judi­
cial reforms have not progressed, and police remain corrupt? The security o f jour­
nalists in a developing state is dependent on all o f the preceding factors, which are 
all dependent on reforming the formidable patron-client relationships endemic to 
many developing world states. Aside from revolution and a wholesale redistribution 
of wealth, how is this reform to be achieved?
4.3 Recommendations
Participants at the Aspen Institute conference on journalism and emerging democ­
racies sponsored by the Aspen Institute arrived at a consensus on how Western gov­
ernments can better promote the advancement of media in the developing world. 
Among their recommendations were: promote governmental reform, including the 
development of a strong, independent judiciary supportive of expressive rights. De­
velop professionalism among journalists, including the creation o f journalistic asso­
ciations and ombudsmen, as well as setting standards through training. Support the 
development of civil society. Promote the development o f sustainable communica­
tions infrastructure. At an abstract level, participants also noted that slow economic 
development of a state can militate against independent media development due to 
corruption within the larger community and also corruption o f the journalists them-
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selves. Furthermore, the physical safety of journalists must be ensured before any of 
the other functions can be performed.268 All o f these factors should be taken into 
consideration when contemplating a media assistance intervention. Weak links 
within the chain o f political development must be identified and targeted. Where 
leadership is lacking, will independent media be tolerated? Where the legal system is 
nascent, will the rights o f the media be protected? Where social developments of 
literacy and education are poor, can the role o f the media in transition be compre­
hended? These enabling conditions -  leadership, law and human development - are 
but three conditions that must be bolstered, or at least exist at a rudimentary level, 
otherwise stand alone media assistance interventions seemed doomed to fail.
If CIDA is going to continue to fund media projects, this paper recommends that 
a programmatic approach, modeled upon the guidelines used by USAID, be imple­
mented. In the 1999 report "The Role o f Media in Democracy: A Strategic Ap­
proach", USAID proposed five programmatic approaches or menu options for suc­
cessful media interventions.269 They are: 1. Shaping the Legal Enabling Environ­
ment, 2. Strengthening Constituencies for Reform, 3. Removing Barriers to Access, 4. 
Supporting the Capitalization of Media and 5. Training. Ideally, each of these five 
points is addressed coincidentally; otherwise the media intervention may encounter 
insurmountable obstacles. Each of the five points has, under each heading, several 
benchmarks to be achieved. For example, in shaping the legal enabling environment, 
the USAID document speaks of not only aiding in the formation o f laws that protect
268 Aspen, 3
269 USAID. The Role o f  Media in Democracy: A  Strategic Approach, available from h t tp : / /w w w . usaid.
gov/democracy/, 10.
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the media but also a dedication to implementing those laws. As well, the training of 
media lawyers is a vital component o f establishing a legal framework. Additionally, 
the provision of a legal defence fund for journalists is encouraged. Lastly, CIDA 
may be well advised to better select states for success. Often media assistance inter­
ventions occur in states that do not have the structure in place to foster independent 
media. Some o f the indicators of increased freedom and effectiveness o f the media 
culled from Kapoor include:
-relaxed censorship laws
-less government interference in the media
-heightened editorial independence of state media
-less harassment of journalists
-less state/private monopolization of media
-increased privately-owned media (without private monopolies or cartels)
-decreased legal proceedings taken against censorship
-increased % of professionally trained journalists
-existence of strengthened professional journalist associations270
To this list I add one more important indicator o f the likelihood o f a successful 
media assistance intervention: what is the economic condition of the state? Since a 
"nation's media are prisoners o f the country's economic and political structures and 
its place in world history",271 the assumption that independent and plural media will 
flourish regardless o f economic (and historic) reality is nai’ve.
In summary, these are the recommendations of this study:
• Concentrate resources by targeting fewer countries for media assistance.
• Establish criteria for selecting states for media assistance by analyzing their 
likelihood of adopting the principles o f plural independent media based on 
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political development because, given the often small amounts committed by 
Canada to media assistance, the pooling o f resources may accrue greater 
benefit in the most promising states. Pooling resources in fewer countries can 
also free up resources to sustain interventions. In selecting states, Canada 
should ask if there is confidence that leadership will commit to sustaining 
media? Are there indications that a rule o f law will prevail?
• When targeting a country for media assistance, take a comprehensive multi­
sector approach that not only trains journalists but also bolsters civil society 
and the political and legal institutions that support free media.
• Advance media professionalism. Closely select individuals for training, 
monitor their progress and support them and the NGOs working in this area 
morally, physically and financially, so as to deter corruption
• Develop indigenous journalism training by funding university programs at 
credible institutions, research chairs and scholarships to study both within the 
recipient country and Canada.272 Through these initiatives young journalists 
must somehow become imbued with a strong aversion to bribe-taking and 
other forms o f corruption, as well as develop a resistance to self-aggrandizing, 
score-settling tendencies.
• Improve salaries o f journalists which, admittedly, will be a difficult task to 
accomplish. Wholesale economic improvements across the developing world 
seem likely the only solution to this challenge.
• Support indigenous self-regulating agencies
272 There is already precedent for this: the Canadian Embassy in the Philippines awards die MacLuhan scholarship 
annually. However, this scholarship is often awarded to an experienced working journalist. It is the contention of 
this study that benefits would accrue from scholarships to study in Canada awarded to younger, less experienced 
journalism students.
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4.4 What has happened since Windhoek?
On May 3rd, 1991 at the 26th session o f UNESCO’s General Conference at Wind­
hoek, Namibia, delegates endorsed the Windhoek Declaration. The sweeping docu­
ment sets out a bold agenda for media freedom in Africa. Windhoek asserts that “the 
establishment, maintenance and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free 
press is essential to the development and maintenance o f democracy in a nation, and 
for economic development”. Point 10 is a call for the international community to 
“direct funding support towards the development and establishment of nongovern­
mental newspapers, magazines and periodicals that reflect the society as a whole and 
the different points o f view within the communities they serve".273 Nearing fourteen 
years since the declaration, the question arises as to what has happened since Wind­
hoek. The most obvious and easily identifiable outcome o f Windhoek has been more 
talking. Subsequent conferences were held in Almaty, Kazakhstan (1992) and Santi­
ago, Chile (1994) with the goal o f each conference to advance free media in Asia and 
Latin America, respectively. But while Western governments have apparently re­
sponded by contributing ODA to advance the media in the developing world, we 
must ask if the leaders of African states have fulfilled their responsibilities. Recent 
interference in the functioning of the media in Uganda and Zimbabwe, to name but 
two African states highlight the precarious status of journalism across the continent. 
Leaders o f developing world states have an obligation to advance the media, other­
wise, little will come of Western efforts.
273 Many of the recommendations, above, such as establishing more journalistic training institutes, were included in 
Windhoek’s recommendations. See Martin, 338.
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